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SPAIN'S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE IMPACT OF NATO

by

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June, 1996

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AND THE IMPACT OF NATO**

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
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
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


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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategic culture has been both lauded as an important analytical tool in explaining behavior, and disparaged as an explanation of last resort. Theorists of strategic culture hold that, in certain circumstances, persistent beliefs and behavior patterns may suggest probable responses to threats or opportunities. This thesis, an examination of recent Spanish history from a strategic culture perspective, supports the use of strategic culture as a reliable indicator of probable state actions, at times despite the rhetoric of the state's political leadership. Well-established aspects of strategic culture appear to persist in the absence of a cataclysmic event capable of modifying the patterns and beliefs of the preceding system. Barring such a catastrophic event, a state is likely to act in accordance with its traditional strategic culture.

The traditional Spanish strategic culture of isolationism arose from the aftermath of the exceptionally short, and one-sided, Spanish-American war. The loss of empire at this time, and the inability of Spain's political elites to deal effectively with this situation, resulted in a fractioning of the artificially maintained two-party parliamentary system. Regional politics frustrated attempts to consolidate an effective government and fears of a socialist revolution culminated in the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The Franco regime which assumed power after the war augmented Spanish isolationism through oppressive domestic measures which subjugated the public under rule of force, and closed the economy to foreign markets. Martial law was in effect until 1948, and hundreds of

thousands were imprisoned, exiled, or executed if suspected of opposing Franco's rule.

Franco's support to the Axis powers during World War II resulted in Spain being barred from the United Nations, and kept Spain from benefitting from the Marshall Plan in the postwar years. Shunned by the rest of the world following World War II, isolation was forced upon Spain which began to suffer economically through bad harvests, droughts, industrial backwardness, and depletion of monetary reserves. Franco's regime was at the verge of collapse in the late 1940's. Revolution was averted by a monetary aid package from the United States offered in return for military basing rights as a strategic response to the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Opposition parties in Spain came to harbor deep anti-American sentiments towards the United States, seen as supporting and legitimizing Franco's dictatorship to the rest of the world.

The peaceful transition since 1975 from authoritarian to democratic rule, as well as security assurances from the United States since 1953, have kept Spain from experiencing a trauma powerful enough to fundamentally alter its strategic culture. The pronouncements of Spanish resolve to become more integrated within the European community, and to be a dependable NATO ally, have not been borne out by its actions. Spain appears to be unable to shrug off the strategic culture of isolationism which it has been burdened with since 1898. Spain's problems in domestic politics, economics, and military and foreign affairs may be attributed to a difficult national democratization process as well as to a strategic culture of isolationism. Owing to these larger factors,

membership in NATO has had little impact on changing what has become an enduring legacy of Franco's despotic rule - a strategic culture of isolation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the 'early' or 'formative' military experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and state elites as these develop through time. A-historical or 'objective' variables such as technology, polarity, or relative material capabilities are all of secondary importance. It is strategic culture...that gives meaning to these variables.¹

Since 1977, "strategic culture" has become an increasingly prominent analytical perspective to allow political analysts and observers to better understand, and explain, what drives nations to act as they do. It has opened an avenue of reasoning that has helped to explain acts that did not conform to what would have been predicted using dominant "rational actor" models.

Culture-based theories for explaining state behavior have been both vigorously supported and attacked. Jack Snyder, credited with coining the term, later clarified his position on the use of culture in analyzing state actions. He explained that "culture...enters the story when a distinctive approach to strategy becomes ingrained in training, institutions, and force posture", and that "culture presumably helps to explain the persistence of distinct approaches in the face of disconfirming evidence as well as distinctive patterns of learning that are coloured by pre-existing institutions and ideas."

¹ Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture", International Security, Vol. 19, Spring 1995, p.34.

But Snyder was wary of advancing cultural influences as an explanation for state actions superior to more traditional "self-help", "realist", or "rational-actor" models. He warned that "culture is an explanation of last resort....to be used only when all else fails."²

"All else" seems to have failed in explaining the slow, and often tortuous, transition of Spain from authoritarian rule under Generalissimo Francisco Franco to democratic rule since Franco's death in 1975. Considering the current state of Spain's political, military, and economic health, many of the decisions made by the Spanish political elite since 1975 cannot be considered models of "rational actor" thought. Several of the policies and institutions approved since democratic rule in Spain was re-established appear to be counterproductive and even self-defeating rather than oriented toward "self-help". A cultural perspective may provide the insight necessary to understand current political and economic trends in Spain.

Strategic culture "represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices: these may be, depending on the nation, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion."³ The 1975 transition to democratic rule upended the nearly forty-year structure of authoritarian rule in Spain. The authority for deciding political action was no longer vested in a single individual with the backing of

² Jack Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor", in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London, Macmillan, 1990) p.4.

³ Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed", in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (Macmillan, London, 1990) p.121.

a strong army, but was instead thrust upon a people unaccustomed, in recent memory, to making any political decisions for themselves. Rhetoric and rationality were not sufficient in themselves to fundamentally alter the collective beliefs and values instilled during the course of Franco's thirty-seven year rule (1938-1975). The transition process included little strategic thought with regard to dealing with potential upheavals in the nascent democracy, particularly with changes to the organizational structure of the military and its political strengths. The transition to democracy in Spain is remarkable in that it was accomplished without a high level of internal violence, and without an identifiable external threat. The peaceful nature of the transition did not require Spain to re-engineer its collective strategic culture.

Kenneth Booth argues that the primary characteristic of strategic culture is its persistence over time, and that the elements that define a strategic culture "tend to outlast all but major changes in military technology, domestic arrangements or the international environment."⁴ Booth did not define what he meant by a "major change." Certainly the demise of a lengthy and egregious dictatorship as Spain had experienced under Franco, and the construction out of that regime of support for democratic self-rule can be considered "major." In the sense of initiating long-term change in a system of beliefs, however, the effecting catalyst must be more than "major", it must be "cataclysmic". The peaceful nature of the ongoing Spanish democratization process has served to preserve the behavior patterns cultivated during Franco's rule. In this respect, the Spanish democratic

⁴ Ibid.

transition has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

In attempting to explain the assertion of hegemony in global economics, Stephen D. Krasner was forced to rethink an initial supposition that he found was not supported by the facts. His research uncovered a clear disparity between the time a state gained pre-eminence in the international marketplace, and the time that state asserted its pre-eminence.⁵ Krasner saw that, in his studies of the transition from *Pax Britannica* to *Pax Americana*, the British commitment to openness in international commerce continued long after Britain's economic power had declined, and that the American commitment to openness did not begin until well after the United States had become the world's leading economic power. Krasner was forced to amend his original argument in order to account for the time delay. He forwarded the opinion that states tend to maintain currently held values in status and hierarchy until "some cataclysmic external event...moves states to policy initiatives in line with state interests. Once policies have been adopted, they are pursued until a new crisis demonstrates that they are no longer feasible. States become locked in by the impact of prior choices on their domestic political structures."⁶ This statement on the semi-permanence of previously established norms was made in 1975, two

⁵ Stephen Krasner was testing a theory which equated willingness for "openness" in a national economy to that economy's relative position in the international economic hierarchy. The more hegemonic the state, the more open that state's economy. His original expectations were based in traditional "state-power" theories of international relations. (Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", in World Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., No.3, April 1976)).

⁶ Ibid., p.341.

years before Jack Snyder put the term "strategic culture" to paper. Krasner's postulate coincided well with Snyder's definition of strategic culture, which suggested "that once a distinctive approach to strategy had taken hold, it tended to continue despite changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of socialization and institutionalization and through the role of strategic concepts in legitimating these social arrangements."⁷

According to Krasner, for change in currently held values to occur with some relative immediacy, the change must be initiated by some "cataclysmic" event - an event which threatens the very survival of the system it challenges. The last event that fit this description in the history of Spain was the 1898 Spanish-American War. The severity of the Spanish loss to the Americans initiated a tangible move away from a previous Spanish strategy of imperialism, and toward one of isolationism. The isolationism that was planted in 1898 was buttressed by the Franco policies following the Spanish Civil War, and it continues to be the aspect of Spain's historical character most resistant to change.

Since its accession into NATO in May of 1982, Spain's cooperation with, and active expressions of commitment to, its new partners, has been in keeping with its reputation for non-participation on the international stage. Shortly after acceptance into the Atlantic Alliance, Spain's continued membership became questionable with the election

⁷ Jack Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations" (Rand R-2154-AF, Santa Monica, CA., 1977) p.v.

victory of the Spanish Socialist Worker Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE), which decided to suspend the process of Spain's incorporation into NATO institutions pending a national referendum on the matter. "During the party's 1976 congress, the PSOE 'opposed entry into NATO, inasmuch as this step would make Spain dependent on the United States' military strategy. As an alternative to membership in NATO, the PSOE advocated conducting a policy of neutrality.' This position was re-affirmed at its 1979 congress."⁸ Having assumed governmental control after Spain delivered the accession documents in Washington, and membership in NATO had been formally ratified, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez thought "it would be potentially more destabilizing to East-West tensions if Spain were now to withdraw from the bloc."⁹ The years following the 1982 elections have witnessed the solidification of Spain's relationship to NATO on culturally influenced Spanish terms.

To understand the Spanish strategic culture properly, it is necessary to review the formative experiences of the state from a cultural perspective, and to consider how those experiences have molded a unique and enduring Spanish national character. Experiences can be interpreted from a variety of differing perspectives to explain any particular state's rise to modernity, current economic health, or any of a number of other specialized concerns. It is only after strategic culture has been identified and defined that judgements

⁸ Kenneth Maxwell, Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO., 1991), p.124.

⁹ Ibid., p.126.

in any of these other areas can be made with some degree of confidence. Rational actor models cannot be readily applied until the 'rationality' of the actor has been identified; that 'rationality' will include the predispositions attributable to cultural experiences.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPANISH STRATEGIC CULTURE

Understanding strategic culture is a fundamental part of 'knowing thine enemy', one of the most basic principles of war. It contributes to an appreciation of another nation's behaviour in its own terms, and this is the starting point of understanding.¹⁰

When people affirm a Spanish tradition of neutrality they overlook the origins of that neutrality in contemporary Spain. It was a neutrality born of impotence, impotence which itself sprang from a lack of the most minimal agreement on internal political matters.¹¹

Spanish isolationism was a direct result of the Spanish-American War in 1898, which marked the end of Spanish colonialism with the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The suddenness and totality of the Spanish defeat by the United States, as well as the lack of European support to Spain in this conflict, resulted in a cataclysmic intellectual and political redefinition of Spain's position in the world. The "Generation of 1898" confronted Spain with the proposition that "Spain had long ceased to be a country of consequence, that its society was archaic, and that its institutions were outworn and incapable of moving into the twentieth century."¹²

The constitutional monarchy government (First Republic), established in 1875 and

¹⁰ Ken Booth, p.125.

¹¹ Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, Spain's Entry Into NATO - Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, CO., 1988), p.12.

¹² Eric D. Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, Spain, A Country Study (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990), p.30.

based on the British two-party parliamentary system, had long been artificially maintained through a process of electoral manipulation fraught with corruption. The inability of this government to effectively deal with the events of 1898 resulted in the rise of a number of personalist and regional political groups which broke the hegemony of the two-party system, leaving the parliamentary government in disarray. "By 1915 it was virtually impossible to form a coalition government that could command the support of a parliamentary majority."¹³ Right wing conservatives blamed the parliamentary system for corrupting the government and called for a return to authoritarian rule.

Although neutral during World War I, Spain was engaged in hostilities with the Berbers in Morocco, where Spain had allied with France in declaring a protectorate. As the Moroccan hostilities progressed, the Spanish Army did not receive essential resupply of equipment from Spain, and, as a result, experienced debilitating losses of personnel. Spanish officers returning from the battlefield formed *juntas* to express their dissatisfaction with the scarcity of military supplies at the front, and also with the excessive inflation rate in Spain. Military salaries, low to begin with, were not raised to keep pace with inflation. These conditions, along with industrial unrest and increased instances of anarchist and communist terrorist activity, resulted in a general officer, Miguel Primo de Rivera, being elected to office; and, with him, Spain returned to authoritarian rule. This new regime enjoyed the confidence and political trust of the Spanish people, the king (Alfonso XIII),

¹³ Ibid., p.31.

and the army.¹⁴

Primo de Rivera dissolved parliament and ruled with the assistance of the military. Protectionism led to temporary economic recovery, and better supply lines to the Spanish army helped to bring a fairly rapid and successful end to the hostilities in Morocco in 1926. With no explicit system of government offered to replace the ousted parliament, criticism of Primo de Rivera's rule began to be voiced. With an unpopular move to reform the military promotion system Primo de Rivera lost the backing of the army, and eventually fell into disfavor with the Crown. Primo de Rivera resigned in 1930, leaving behind no stable government to take over.¹⁵

Municipal elections held in 1931 were won overwhelmingly by the antimonarchist parties. King Alfonso, fearing that the outcome would be followed by a civil war, abdicated his throne and moved himself and his family from the country after his army chief of staff refused to support him. With the monarch no longer the head of state, the various political parties began to struggle for political leadership and factionalization within the parties increased. It fell upon the conservative military to assume responsibility for maintaining order amidst the mounting confusion. The military forcibly suppressed the widespread labor strikes, which came to be used as political weapons by the leftist parties. The strikes confirmed to the conservatives, the military included, that the leftist groups

¹⁴ Ibid., pp.31-32.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.32 .

would not abide by constitutional processes to voice their political desires, while the left saw the often violent breakup of the union strikes as proof of the fascist tendencies of the right.¹⁶

As tensions continued to build, the leftist government resigned and, in February 1936, a round of general elections was held. The many socialist factions consolidated under the banner of the Spanish Popular Front as an electoral coalition. The election results brought cries of voting fraud from nearly every political group involved, and two run-off elections were conducted in which the Spanish Popular Front acquired a large number of parliamentary seats. The socialist victories were seen as a precursor to a greater leftist revolution, a perception which led to street riots, church burnings, and more labor strikes. The president was removed from office on the grounds that he did not have the constitutional authority to have called for the general elections in the first place. The army delivered a "pronunciamiento"¹⁷ demanding a government coup. This heralded the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, which led to the rise to power of army general Francisco Franco, who became head of state in 1938 and ruled until his death in 1975.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 32-33.

¹⁷ A 'declaration of principles' from within the military ranks. An officer, or group of officers, would seek a consensus among fellow officers in opposing or supporting a particular policy or change in government. If any government were to succeed, it needed the support of the army. The pronunciamiento was considered within the army to be the purest form of election because the soldiers were expressing their willingness to shed blood to make their point. (Eric D. Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, pp.25-26.)

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 33-40.

Isolation deepened during the oppressive Franco regime. "Franco played on the nationalist, isolationist impulses of Spaniards to insulate his regime from foreign criticism of its practices."¹⁹ During the experience under Franco an attitude of non-intervention and aloofness on the international political stage became significant in Spanish strategic culture. "Non-participation" became synonymous with "Spain." It became the defining term of the Spanish political approach to international relations, and was the posture assumed to be taken by Spain whenever predictions of Spanish involvement in political situations were raised. This culture of non-participation was encouraged by the neglect of Spain by the international community, and by the isolationism wrought by Franco himself.

A. FRANCO'S SPAIN

"Severe repression marked the early years of the regime, as Franco sought to impose absolute political control and to institutionalize the Nationalist victory in the Civil War."²⁰ Franco saw as his first priority the stamping out of the regional differences to which he attributed the demise of the Second Republic. It was Franco's ultimate desire to restore Spain to the grandeur and glory of pre-Spanish-American War imperialism, often referred to by Franco as the "eternal Spain".

¹⁹ Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain: Domestic Politics and Security Policy", Adelphi Paper #204 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1986), p.5.

²⁰ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.45.

To achieve this former greatness required national unification. Diverse separatist and regional political groups could only serve to create disunity within the country. Strong contingents of the elite Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) were deployed to those regions where separatist views had been voiced, primarily in the Basque, Catalan, and Galician areas. Martial law was declared in July of 1936, and remained in effect until 1948. The Nationalist victors showed little mercy towards the defeated leftists; they were captured and imprisoned, exiled or executed. Hundreds of thousands received sentences to life imprisonment, and the number of executions averaged about 1000 per week. Franco and his Assessor-General, Martinez Fusset, met once every 24 hours to discuss and approve the execution lists. The International Committee of Jurists estimate that nearly 193,000 executions took place in Spain in the first four years following the Spanish Civil War.²¹

As the Civil War continued, Franco spoke publicly on the course that he envisioned for Spain's future:

When the prestige of our nation makes her worthy of the respect of other nations: when our ships, powerful and majestic, once again fly the flag of our motherland on the high seas; when our aircraft cross the firmaments and make evident the resurgence of Spain; when Spaniards, all of you, shall uplift your arms and raise your hearts in homage to the motherland; when no Spanish hearth shall be in want of fire and bread and the joy of life -- then shall we say to our fallen and our martyrs: your blood

²¹ Alan Lloyd, Franco (Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N.J., 1969), pp.174-175.

has borne fruit....²²

The following day, all opposing political parties were abolished. The Falange and Carlist²³ parties were consolidated into a single national political entity whose main role was to keep the Franco government apprised of Spanish political sentiments, and to disseminate the thoughts of the state. Membership in the newly formed "National Movement" political institution was the only means of political advancement for Spanish civil servants, many of whom had previously refrained from aligning with any political body.

In keeping with his desires to enforce a completely unified Spain, Franco decreed that Catholicism would be the only religion recognized by the government. Only marriages carried out under the auspices of the Catholic church were legal; divorce was outlawed; religious education became mandatory in the school system; Mass was said regularly in the army; and the Jesuits regained their property and position. Censorship of the press took effect in April of 1938, and the texts of books and newspapers required state approval. Authors and editors were liable to prosecution if anything they produced was later deemed

²² George Hills, Franco: The Man and His Nation (The Macmillan Company, New York, N.Y., 1967), p.310.

²³ In 1937, Franco had tasked his brother-in-law with investigating the political situation. Details of various parties' ideologies were recounted to Franco, along with copies of various speeches by Falangist and Carlist leaders. While a conclusion was reached that none of the existing parties was suitable for a new Spain, Franco was intrigued by similarities in the Carlist and Falangist tenets: neither party had any use for parliamentary rule; both advocated authoritarianism; and both wanted social reform. (George Hills, p.308.)

offensive to the government.²⁴

Franco took steps to reinforce his ability to identify anyone who might be an opponent to his rule. The Civil Guard was strengthened and employed throughout the country in famous “parejos” (pairs) to patrol Spanish highways in a highly conspicuous manner. Machine gun emplacements were erected at major crossroads, and garrisons of soldiers were maintained outside of Madrid and other major cities, ready to crush any signs of revolt.²⁵

While Franco understood the necessity of maintaining the sentiments of the peasants and agricultural workers in support of his regime, the methods he employed often resulted less in improving their lives than in keeping them under control. This complete subjugation of the Spanish population, in every aspect of their working and social interactions, for a period which ultimately extended across two generations, would ultimately lead to a paradigm of non-involvement and non-confrontation in post-Franco domestic politics..

Because Franco was assisted both monetarily and militarily by Germany and Italy during the Spanish Civil War, it appeared inevitable that Spain would join the Axis powers

²⁴ Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA., 1974), p.216.

²⁵ Richard Herr, p.212.

in the widening conflicts of World War II. Yet, despite rhetoric from both Hitler and Mussolini towards the end of enlisting Spanish involvement, Spain, fairly early in the war, took a neutral stance.

With the early war successes of the German armies, and with a German presence on Spain's northern border, Franco saw an opportunity to advance his plans for a Spanish return to imperial glory. An offer was made to the Germans whereby Spain would enter the hostilities on the side of the Axis powers in return for certain territorial gains following the war. Franco's demands included: French Morocco, the Oran sector of Algeria, parts of West and Equatorial Africa, and Gibraltar.²⁶ Spain's official wartime status changed from neutrality to that of non-belligerency while proclaiming Spain's "will to empire." This shift in wartime status permitted the Germans to use Spanish ports and airfields to replenish their submarines and aircraft, and might have given Spain some leverage in postwar territorial claims should the Axis powers have defeated the Allies.²⁷ A formal declaration of war at this time would have opened Spain to an attack by the Allied forces, particularly by the British and Free French forces in Gibraltar. Franco reasoned that if and when Spain should officially enter, it would be both late in the conflict, and followed quickly by a decisive German victory, thus shielding Spain from any direct military assault from the Allies. But by August of 1940, with the British resistance gathering strength, the prospect

²⁶ Benny Pollack, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy, Spain's International Relations from Franco to Democracy (St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y., 1987), p.6.

²⁷ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.50.

that the United States was preparing to enter the war, and no response from Germany on Spanish territorial demands, Franco embarked on a campaign of stalling Spain's entry into hostilities. Some observers think that Franco, by the end of 1940, had decided that non-intervention would be Spain's final position on entry into the conflict whether or not Germany agreed to Spanish territorial demands.²⁸

While Germany considered Franco's demands for Spanish participation on the side of the Axis powers, Franco forwarded excuses in response to German inquiries about Spain's delays in actually mobilizing any forces. In December 1940, there was inadequate transport to move any troops. In January 1941, there was too much snow; in February, too much rain. In March 1941, Franco agreed to send 100,000 workers to Germany, but after much delay, only 20,000 workers, unskilled by German standards, actually went.²⁹ These workers were attracted primarily by wages that averaged seven times what they could earn in Spain.³⁰ Once the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, Franco could no longer delay taking some action in support of Germany, and sent an 18,000 man, all-volunteer, "Blue Division" to assist the Germans on the Eastern Front. Franco still believed that a quick German victory was not far off, and he considered that the participation of the Blue Division would ensure recognition of Spain's colonial claims after

²⁸ Benny Pollack, p.8.

²⁹ Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL., 1959), p.160.

³⁰ George Hills, p.378.

the war was over.³¹

The participation of the Blue Division forces fighting alongside the Germans on the Eastern Front had been militarily insignificant, and in no way contributed to any Axis victories. By prolonging negotiations with Germany, Spain was able to delay its own involvement until the most crucial timeframe had passed. Franco was thus able to avoid an Axis or Allied invasion of Spain. Franco covered Spanish procrastination with an effective verbal campaign in support of the Axis powers. This helped to shield Spain from violence at the hands of the disappointed Germans.³² The internal political confusion which allowed the rise of Franco to power demanded his full attention and energies to prevent any further breakup of the state, and to maintain his current position. The reconstitution of order following the Spanish Civil War was the primary goal of Franco's early rule, and energies could not be expended in external pursuits. Franco could claim that any debt to Germany for having provided military and financial assistance during the Spanish-Civil War had been repaid by having provided a testing ground for the German military equipment and tactics that were now engaged in the larger European conflict.³³

In the end, it is clear, the Spanish commitment to the Axis involved more than a broad sympathetic identification with Axis goals, and Franco often verbalized this support

³¹ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.50.

³² Annette Baker Fox, p.162.

³³ Benny Pollack, p.4.

in public fora. By 1944, however, with the shift in wartime advantages having visibly moved to the Allies, Franco disassociated himself from ties with Germany. He even offered to the Allies that Spain could play an important role in rebuilding Europe once peace had been declared. The greater part of the European community resented the opportunism displayed by Spain during the war, and felt that it should not go unpunished. In response to this, Franco let it be known that Spain was "very happy" with the Allied victory and promised to extradite any German or Nazi collaborator seeking shelter from war crimes prosecution in Spain. Pictures of Hitler and Mussolini were removed from the Pardo Palace and replaced by pictures of the Pope.³⁴

In an immediate post-war attempt to gain a foothold in the emerging political order, including the formation of the United Nations, Franco re-organized large sectors of his governmental structures, replaced pro-Nazi members of his Cabinet with moderates, and enacted a declaration of civil rights for the Spanish people. These changes were offered solely for international consumption and were of no real consequence in the continuance of the repressive Spanish government. Suggestions by the international community that Franco dismantle the Falange and the state-controlled unions were curtly rejected. Spain was subsequently rejected as a possible member in the United Nations, and France suggested that the Allies should invade Spain. An economic blockade against the Franco regime was enacted. This intentional cold shoulder treatment only served to fuel and deepen isolationist and anti-Western feelings in the already economically impoverished

³⁴ Benny Pollack, pp.12-13.

nation.³⁵

B. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL ISOLATION

Under Franco the state provided jobs, the state determined wages, and unapproved group association by workers was a punishable offense. The state destroyed trade unions, confiscating their funds and property. "Franco restricted individual liberties and suppressed challenges to his authority. The regime imposed prison terms for 'revolutionary activity', and executions were carried out through 1944."³⁶ In August of 1938, Franco created the National Wheat Service to manage the marketing of grain. Farmers were required to sell their produce directly to this Service at fixed prices. The Service would then redistribute the wheat to bakers and other consumers. Faced with having to feed a nation torn apart after a devastating civil war, Franco's government effectively took control of the production and distribution of this vital commodity.³⁷ Agricultural workers were forced to work within vertically structured syndicates that were to be overseen by the Falange. Laborers were also became subject to the first of Franco's "Fundamental Laws", the Fuero del Trabajo (Labor Charter), which detailed terms of obligations and rights of the working class. The Labor Charter provided that it was the duty of all Spaniards to work, and the responsibility of the state to assure them: the right

³⁵ Ibid., pp.14-15.

³⁶ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.45.

³⁷ Richard Herr, p.220.

to work, adequate wages, paid vacations, and a limit to the number of hours they could be worked. Worker compliance with the Labor Charter was virtually assured by declaring treasonous any activity which would disturb production; the charter was expressly designed to deter labor strikes.³⁸

In 1941, the industrial sector was nationalized with the formation of the Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Industrial Institute -- INI). Foreign investments in Spanish industry were severely curtailed. Most notably, agreements with Germany to exploit Spanish mineral deposits were rescinded. The institute was designed to subsidize industries in key sectors of the economy where private enterprise alone was unable to achieve self-sufficiency, but also was granted the power to take over existing enterprises and create new ones when necessary.³⁹ In theory, the INI was to become detached from its business strongholds once those businesses proved themselves capable of standing alone; in fact, the INI found it extremely difficult to divest itself of any of its undertakings, most of which never became profitable. The INI operated a wide variety of business ventures, with a controlling interest in almost fifty firms by 1957, including textiles manufacture, cellulose products, cement, chemicals, aluminum, naval construction, and merchant shipping.⁴⁰

³⁸ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, pp.41-42.

³⁹ Ibid., p.173.

⁴⁰ Richard Herr, p.222.

Spanish self-sufficiency under Franco's authoritarian rule was never realized.

Industrial development grew at a snail's pace, and then only after a huge monetary outlay by a government which found its reserves rapidly diminishing. The capital industries of automobile manufacture and iron and steel production were fraught with inefficiency and corruption. Spain's sources of necessary material imports had been cut off as its European suppliers diverted those materials to the requirements of a lengthy World War. The economic situation within Spain continued to deteriorate. Institutions established to control and equitably distribute vital foodstuffs themselves became rife with instances of favoritism and corruption. Agricultural products often went to whoever was willing to pay the highest prices. Wheat imported from Argentina to alleviate the food shortage ended up being sold on grocer's shelves in Italy. Farmers hid their produce from the government in order to sell it at better prices on the black market. Poverty, undernourishment and tuberculosis ran rampant in cities overflowing with large numbers of rural immigrants seeking employment.⁴¹

Beginning in 1945, a series of bad harvests, due to drought and a lack of fertilizers, forced Spain to deplete its federal reserves to purchase foreign grains. The droughts also caused a lowering of the water levels in dams capable of producing electricity, and, by 1950, electricity in the Madrid area was being. In Barcelona, textile factories could operate only one day a week unless they had an independent means of producing electricity. In keeping with the Labor Charter employers were still required to pay workers

⁴¹ Ibid., p.234.

in full for their regular hours. A major objective of the labor syndicates was to provide for the welfare of the workers through an extensive system of social insurance promised in the Fundamental Laws. The problem was that social security costs were becoming excessive; employers deducted so much from the workers' wages to pay the syndicate's health, retirement, and other social insurance that it was impossible for a worker to support his family on that which remained.⁴² "As the 1940's drew to a close, agricultural imbalances, labor unrest, and a growing pressure for industrial development forced the regime to begin to modify its autarchic policies. Spain's need for food, raw materials, energy, and credit made it necessary for the country to establish some link to the international economy."⁴³

C. SALVAGING SPAIN

Spain's European neighbors, faced with costly rebuilding following the devastation of World War II, and with the knowledge that Franco's rule had been secured with assistance from both Germany and Italy, had little sympathy for Spanish economic problems. "Even as late as the early 1970's, Franco's Spain was considered a pariah by a large part of the international community, and hence was excluded from many of the organizations which developed during the post World War II period, especially in the European context."⁴⁴ Spain was denied entry into the UN in 1945 primarily because of

⁴² Ibid., pp.233-234.

⁴³ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.46.

⁴⁴ Kenneth Maxwell, p.3.

Axis involvement in bringing Spain's authoritarian government to power. Spain's subsequent exclusion from any benefits of the Marshall Plan was used by Franco to strengthen his position within the Spanish government, and to support his defiant isolationism. Furthermore, Franco was not perturbed when, in December 1946, a UN General Assembly resolution banned Spain from any UN involvement as long as Franco remained in power.⁴⁵

The United States was quick to recognize the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula in light of the emerging Cold War with its former Soviet ally. With the direct intentions of establishing its own strategic access to that area, as well as keeping the Soviets from initiating similar overtures, the United States began efforts to normalize relations with Spain in 1948. Spain's pariah status and military weakness were compensated by, in terms of U.S. interests, its geostrategic importance at a time well before any thoughts of NATO membership for Spain were entertained.

The normalization of relations was achieved when, in September of 1950, President Truman authorized \$62.5 million in badly needed financial aid to Spain. Agreements with the United States, brought about by the necessity to address internal turmoil and hardship, eventually integrated the country in an indirect manner into European defense. In return, Spain would allow the construction of military bases to be used jointly by the two countries, with Spain retaining ultimate sovereignty over the land

⁴⁵ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.51.

areas. The United States played a key role in supporting a U.N. resolution to lift the international boycott against the Franco regime, thus "legitimizing" the dictatorship in the eyes of much of the rest of the world. This legitimization did not go unnoticed by opposition groups within Spain, which already harbored deep anti-American sentiments stemming from the events of 1898. By 1951, full diplomatic relations had been restored between Spain and the United States.

In 1953, two major agreements further strengthened Franco's dictatorial regime: the Concordat with the Vatican, and the Pact of Madrid. The Concordat allowed for greater independence of the Church within Spain, and indirectly legitimized Franco's rule, in that the Catholic church accepted and supported the precepts of the Concordat. The Pact of Madrid was the formal agreement with the United States to provide for the construction of jointly operated military bases in Spain for renewable ten-year periods. "During the first ten years of the Madrid Pact, the United States sent approximately \$1.5 billion in all kinds of aid to Spain."⁴⁶

While the Pact of Madrid gave Spain economic, technical, and military assistance, it specifically absolved the United States of any responsibility for the defense of Spain should Spain find itself at war. The Pact declared that even indirect aid to Spain must first be considered in view of the United States' interests and relations with other nations, and, in any case, the appropriation of military aid to Spain would require Congressional

⁴⁶ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.52.

approval. Overall, the terms of the Madrid Pact were far less favorable than those which other European countries received under the Marshall Plan, with a full 30% of the total aid received by Spain during the first ten-year period earmarked specifically for defense.⁴⁷

However, the Madrid Pact successfully brought Spain out of a ten-year economic decline, and allowed Franco to claim that the Americans had come to him, not he to them. He publicly proclaimed that Spain did not have to beg or make concessions to the Americans; thus the prestige of his regime was upheld. Franco made it clear that Spain owed gratitude to no one, yet he was probably relieved that economic assistance was offered at a time when the regime desperately needed money and foreign investment.⁴⁸ Spain's strategic location was Franco's trump card in the salvaging of his regime, and the dictator is reported to have professed to his friends, "at long last I have won the Spanish [-American] war."⁴⁹

In 1957 a new set of economic ministers was installed to establish a plan for economic reform and growth, and an economic Stabilization Plan was enacted in 1959. The implementation of this plan was an acknowledgment by the ministers that in order to achieve a nominal level of prosperity, Spain would have to replace the inefficient

⁴⁷ Benny Pollack, p.150.

⁴⁸ E. Ramon Arango, The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy (Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1978), p.138.

⁴⁹ George Hills, p.416.

bureaucratic Falange syndicates. Differential exchange rates would have to be unified, and inflation had to be reduced with a freeze on workers' wages. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) approved of the direction Spain was taking in correcting its economic problems; this meant that more monetary assistance would be sent by the United States and Europe, an amount totaling approximately \$420 million between 1958 and 1960.⁵⁰ In 1961, a delegation from the World Bank worked out a plan for economic growth which was ultimately approved by Franco, but only after all references to economic mistakes by his regime were removed from its reports. Franco was moving toward a more open Spain, and, in fact, began to embrace democratic ideals as not being antithetical to his nationalist desires. He still quite vocally declared that multi-party political systems were "not a constructive solution for opening the way towards a true, orderly and efficient democracy in Spain, and they cannot be tolerated," but he also accepted the principle that critical analysis and legitimate contrasts of opinion "may contribute to the advancement of the community".⁵¹

The first renegotiation of the U.S. basing agreement came in 1963, resulting in the basing of Polaris, and later Poseidon, submarines at the naval base at Rota, and the storing of strategic nuclear weapons at Torrejón.

⁵⁰ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.143.

⁵¹ Arnold Hottinger, Spain in Transition: Franco's Regime, The Washington Papers, vol.2, no.18 (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1974), p.39.

D. DEATH OF FRANCO - THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Generalissimo Francisco Franco died in November 1975. His hand-picked successor, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, promptly became King of Spain.⁵² The gradual liberalization begun in Franco's later years continued under the new king, whose views on democracy were in sharp contrast to those of his predecessor. This presented an opportunity for the United States to push for Spanish membership in NATO, which redoubled its efforts in making that end come to pass. Within two months of Franco's death, the United States and Spain signed a treaty which extended and upgraded their bilateral military agreements. In a resolution accompanying the U.S. ratification of the treaty, the Senate expressed its anticipation of "Spain's full cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."⁵³

The new government called for national elections in June of 1977, with four political parties receiving the majority of votes, a great majority going to the resurrected PSOE party. The peaceful transition to democracy conferred enormous popularity on the king, stemming from his skill, fairness, and commitment to democracy. For the first time in

⁵² See Richard Gunther, "Spain: the Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement", in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, New York, N.Y., 1992).

⁵³ William L. Heiberg, The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83-1 (National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1983), p.1.

41 years, Spain had an elected Parliament.⁵⁴ With the appointment of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as President in the 1981 general elections, real progress was made in the move towards NATO membership. On August 20, 1981, the cabinet agreed to submit Spanish membership in NATO to parliamentary approval.⁵⁵

Certainly Spain's unique geopolitical situation was at the heart of the Spanish government's interest in, and NATO's willingness to entertain, an application to join the Atlantic Alliance. Spain's strategic position constitutes a crossroads of international commerce and communications, offering military opportunity to protect or obstruct the intercontinental sea and air routes which pass through, or are adjacent to, its territory...⁵⁶

Spain's membership in NATO was predicated on U.S. interest in the geostrategic use of its landmasses, and in the controlling position overseeing the Straits of Gibraltar. It was generally acknowledged that Spain had little to offer of military significance to the greater NATO defense, and in reality this was not a concern for the United States. Both France and Great Britain initially balked at the idea of allowing Spain into NATO, but deferred to the desires of the United States. At the same time, Spain's resolve to maintain autonomy was manifested in its sovereignty over areas used by U.S. forces in the 1953 agreement. Spanish reluctance to embrace the arrival of U.S. forces is understandable, given the role that the United States played in providing sustenance to Franco's crumbling

⁵⁴ Constantine Christopher Menges, Spain: the Struggle for Democracy Today, The Washington Papers, vol. VI, no.58 (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1978), p.18.

⁵⁵ Kenneth Maxwell, p.20.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.79.

regime in the 1950's, and unforgotten memories of the Spanish defeat by the United States in the conflict of 1898.

NATO membership had been vigorously opposed by the PSOE party, which still retained strong popular support in many regions of Spain. The strength of that popular support was evident in the PSOE party's victory in the Andalusian regional elections held on May 25, 1982. Fearing that these elections could result in enough support within the Cortes to reopen debate on NATO in the legislature, President Calvo Sotelo instructed the Spanish ambassador to Washington to deposit the membership documents on Sunday, May 30, 1982. The PSOE played on the Sunday entry as a plank in its platform in the electoral campaign. The PSOE decried the "imposed entry" into NATO during the period leading up to the national elections held in October 1982. The national election resulted in the Democratic Center Union (Union de Centro Democrático - UCD) party being replaced by the PSOE as the main party in parliament. This suggested that the public supported rethinking the recent decision to join the Atlantic Alliance. The Socialist platform for the 1982 elections clearly promoted a reversal, a new isolation, from the external links which had been made by the democratic party in power since Franco's death. Article 99 of the Socialist platform promised to freeze NATO integration; Article 83 promised to make national defense more sovereign and independent; and Articles 94 and 95 promised peace, disarmament and detente, and the elimination of the U.S. nuclear forces on Spanish territory.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, p.64.

Speaking in Washington in 1986, Felipe Gonzalez expressed the viewpoint which was of wide opinion in Spain regarding relations with the United States:

It is that given the past experience of Spain, no democratic Spaniard assumes support from the Western democracies for a non-authoritarian Spain; that for Spaniards defense of the West for almost 40 years was not synonymous with the defense of democratic values, and the cozy relationship the U.S. had with Franco and deals between Franco and the U.S. to permit military bases in Spain are regarded as abnegations by Franco of Spanish sovereignty and a condoning by the U.S. of Franco's dictatorship.⁵⁸

Following Franco's death, a fundamental task of the new democracy was to establish a defense and foreign policy more in keeping with its new role and political significance in the Western world and in Europe. The legacy of isolation has been, and continues to be, the enduring hallmark of the old regime. Disputes and posturing with respect to American policy, the denial of base use in some cases, and the forced withdrawal of the USAF tactical fighter-bomber wing based at Torrejon outside Madrid reveal strong elements of isolationism. Such elements were again on display in the decision by Spain, in April 1986, to prohibit the use of its bases for the U.S. raid on Libya. This decision was consistent with Madrid's stated position that the use of its facilities was not intended for missions outside the NATO region. The Spanish government, despite similar arguments against sending troops out of area prominently played out in the Spanish news media, did commit to limited participation in the Persian Gulf War. The Spanish

⁵⁸ Kenneth Maxwell, p.8.

participation in the Gulf War of 1990-91 could be interpreted as a political gesture designed to avoid political reproaches by NATO allies had Spain not actively participated. Public furor in Spain against involvement in the Persian Gulf War may have been linked to memories of the Blue Division's role in helping to maintain relations with Germany during World War II.⁵⁹

The caution which Spain continues to display in its relationship with NATO, and the strategic choices made since the democratization process began in 1975, are understandable when the strategic culture formulated during the period of authoritarian domination and isolation under Franco is considered. "Strategic choices are less responsive to change in the 'objective' strategic environment, since the weight of historical experiences and historically rooted strategic preferences tends to constrain the effects of environmental variables and to mute responses to environmental change. The result is, that if strategic culture does change, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in 'objective' conditions."⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Michael Peck, "Spain: Cautious and Complex," in Defense and Foreign Affairs, July 1988, p.30.

⁶⁰ Alastair Iain Johnston, p.1.

III. ACCESSION INTO NATO

Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo opened the 1981 parliamentary debate on NATO accession with the declaration, 'we must restore Spain's international position, which was denied to it for a long time while there was dictatorship in Spain.'⁶¹

After Franco, the new democracy recognized the necessity to establish stronger political relationships with its European neighbors. The means to establish these relationships presented itself by way of NATO; and the invitation to membership was effectively proffered by a country long held in Spanish disfavor, the United States. Spain's decision to ultimately accept that invitation was a tentative one, fraught with passionate internal debate following a fundamental transition in Spain's political and strategic standing. Spain clearly wanted and needed the political influence and prestige which accompanied NATO membership, but also intensely desired greater independence from the country which was, and is, publicly reproached for having helped sustain Franco's repressive dictatorship.

The sensitive bilateral relationship with the United States, along with a Spanish culture of non-participation rooted in almost 40 years of forced isolation, would result in the clear enunciation of terms for Spanish membership in NATO. These terms were reached after heated political discourse on Spanish national objectives, and on how those objectives could best be met. Spanish membership in NATO came about following a

⁶¹ William L. Heiberg, p.31.

remarkably peaceful transition to democratic processes which were hastily initiated after the death of the nation's authoritarian leader. The United States wasted little time in encouraging other NATO member nations to rethink their stances on the question of Spanish worthiness to join the Alliance. But the desire of Spain's democratic leadership to join NATO, and the invitation to join from NATO itself, were mere formalities in a process that struck much deeper in the Spanish heart. The legacy of isolation from international, and particularly European, politics, and the deeply imbedded distrust of the United States' strategic intentions, resulted in the vocal resurgence of groups devoted to maintaining Spanish independence from external political influence. Why was the United States, a country that was expending so much money and political energy to incorporate this new Spain into the most successful defensive coalition ever constructed, viewed with such disdain and apprehension? It is necessary to recount particular events to make the emotion behind those sentiments understandable.

A. THE U.S. IN SPANISH HISTORY

The nature of the current relationship between Spain and the United States was cast in 1898 with the Spanish-American War. This singular event was to define the direction in which Spanish politics and strategy would, dramatically and possibly irreversibly, be turned. That turn was toward introversion and isolation. The war that the U.S. inflicted upon the Spanish Navy was short, decisive, and exceptionally one-sided. The Spanish Armada was sent to the bottom of Manila Bay; Spain was stripped of the last

of its foreign territorial possessions; and the glory that had come with Spanish imperialism was forever ended. The image of America bullying to take what it wanted, termed "Manifest Destiny" by the Americans, would become ingrained in Spanish sentiments, to resurface whenever discussion turned to the West. Distrust of American expressions of friendship was hardened through experience as American actions toward Spain, following the Spanish-American War, caused further subjugation and continued repression of the Spanish people. During the Spanish Civil War, the position of the United States toward Spain was officially one of neutrality. President Roosevelt ordered an embargo on armaments to both sides in the conflict, but allowed petroleum to continue to be supplied to the Francoists.⁶² While the U.S. refrained from becoming actively involved, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy provided Franco with the military support he needed to crush the Republic.

A French proposal to the United Nations that the Allies should invade and overthrow the Franco regime following World War II received little support in Washington, further cooling any thoughts that Spaniards may have had that the Americans would not allow such repression to continue. In voting to allow the dictatorship a seat at the United Nations, the United States began a trend toward the international legitimization of Franco's regime. This trend would ultimately be viewed in Spain as one in which American self-interest was placed before the rhetoric of its commitment to freedom and

⁶² Victor Alba, "Spain's Entry Into NATO", in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean, (Scholarly Resources, Inc., Wilmington, DE., 1985), p.100.

democracy. The 1953 Spanish-American treaty reinforced the Spanish public's perceptions of Americans as promoters of Franco's dictatorship. This perception was clearly voiced during the 1981 Parliamentary debates on NATO membership by Felipe Gonzalez:

America helped Europe to free itself from fascism, and it not only did not help Spain, but condemned it to dictatorship for many more years.... We have little for which to thank the United States, the last country with which we were at war.⁶³

Following the initiation of normalization of relations between the United States and Spain, and up until his death, Franco enjoyed the company of a number of American presidents and high-ranking American officials who appeared to overlook the true nature of the dictatorship in the hope of securing military advantage in the Cold War. These officials included Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew, Gerald Ford, William Rogers, and Henry Kissinger. Recurrent visits by John Foster Dulles kept Franco apprised of ongoing developments in NATO in the 1950's. In 1975, with all of Europe decrying a series of political executions under Franco, Henry Kissinger took advantage of the situation to renegotiate the American military basing agreements; he made no statement of condemnation for the executions, nor had he appealed for clemency on behalf of those to be executed, as had some European leaders. Insults to Spanish sensibilities were to continue when, upon hearing of the attempted military coup in February 1981, then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, a former NATO commander, commented that it was

⁶³ Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain: Domestic Politics and Security Policy", Adelphi Paper No. 204, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Garden City Press Ltd., Letchworth, 1986), p.6.

"an internal Spanish matter", and President Ronald Reagan would be the last of the leaders of major nations to telephone King Juan Carlos to offer words of support. Reagan's call was made almost 24 hours after the attempted coup's failure, and with negotiations for the surrender of the rebels already underway.⁶⁴ In view of the negative experiences that democratic Spain has had with the United States, it is surprising that Spain would opt for NATO membership as quickly as it did. Equally surprising is the U.S. failure to counter the poor publicity about the United States in Spain, considering the extensive amount of energy then being expended to acquire military basing rights in Spain, a major objective of the American push for Spanish membership in NATO.

The United States, as Spain's sponsor in the membership process, had relatively obvious goals in promoting Spanish partnership in the defensive alliance. Certainly the most important concern of the United States at the time was the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It was because of the ongoing battle for hegemony, which monopolized U.S. attention and concern, that the United States found itself willing to support a dictatorial regime as long as its own immediate strategic objectives were met. American strategists were quick to realize that important concessions would likely be made by Franco in return for salvation of his teetering economy. The denial to Spain of any benefits of the Marshall Plan would plunge that country into economic extremis. Franco likened it to being the eighth hungry person on an island at which a ship arrives with food for only seven.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Victor Alba, pp.98-101.

⁶⁵ George Hills, p.396.

Spain's economic distress proved fortunate to U.S. strategies by providing a means to secured access to military bases on Spanish soil in exchange for the relatively modest sum of \$62.5 million. Spanish membership in NATO would be more actively pursued immediately after democracy was established, precipitated, once again, by U.S. strategic interests and political objectives.

The objectives of the United States in having Spain as a NATO member included the following considerations. The U.S. ability to conduct unilateral operations, outside the direct NATO sphere, might be improved. Spanish involvement in the alliance would bring with it a close working relationship with both Arab and Latin American states, which could extend measurable positive influence in those areas to the United States. Spain's defense spending might increase the European share of the NATO burden. Spain's membership might help to better integrate war planning, as the inclusion of Spain in NATO would significantly simplify logistic concerns for emergency reinforcement and resupply of Europe in future continental disputes. Spanish membership might minimize the U.S. requirement to provide military assistance to Spain by spreading that responsibility among the other NATO members. Spanish membership might enhance U.S. access to the Iberian peninsula, a valuable jump-off point to areas both north and south, and improve the ability to control the all-important gateway to the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar.⁶⁶ While the seemingly hasty nature of the Spanish decision to join NATO might have appeared as a concession to American prompting, the truth was that Spanish

⁶⁶ William L Heiberg, pp.26-30.

objectives and mounting political pressures ultimately made the decision for Spain.

Although NATO membership would entail a costly upgrade of Spanish defense forces, real military enhancements to collective NATO defense from Spanish military forces were viewed as being minor at best. The Spanish military had been organized primarily for the security of Spanish territory, and was recognized to be without the capability for force projection that would be required by NATO membership.

B. POST-FRANCO DEMOCRACY

A primary objective for the newly established democratic government was the re-establishment and strengthening of political attachments to the rest of Europe. Internal reforms were being enacted at an almost break-neck pace, with many of the old regime's restrictions on personal freedoms (censorship of the press, single-party politics, restrictions on language, free association, religion, etc.) being discarded almost overnight. Mass clemency was afforded to all but a few political prisoners (those whose actions had resulted in the taking of a human life), and a movement was begun to depoliticize the military. The democratic embrace of the multi-party system was without bias, providing forums even for groups expressing Communist or strongly separatist sentiments.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ E. Ramón Arango, The Spanish Political System: Franco's Legacy (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO., 1978) pp.253-255.

A resurgent Spanish Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español-PSOE), outlawed during Franco's regime, presented Adolfo Suarez's democratic transitional government with its strongest opposition element. Opposition strength grew in tandem with anti-Western sentiments in the hearts of Spaniards when an increasingly transparent lean toward the Atlantic Alliance became evident. From the Democratic Party's (Union de Centro Democratico-UCD) viewpoint, the necessity for NATO membership was rooted in the perceived need for Spain to integrate with Europe, most desirably through the European Community (EC), but at the time NATO was the only invitation being offered. While advances towards EC membership were being made, the snail-pace of those efforts, together with a Prime Minister who appeared to be more concerned with strengthening ties with Latin America than Europe, caused some disruption and fragmentation within the UCD. On election day, June 15, 1977, there were more than 100 political parties vying for the public's vote; only six parties would prove to be of significance, including the UCD, the PSOE, and the Popular Alliance (PA).⁶⁸

The months leading up to the general elections were marred by a swelling undercurrent of violence, mostly from extreme rightist elements who desired to see a return to the Spain of the early Franco years, and who were intent on disrupting the democratic reforms and political processes instituted under Adolfo Suarez's leadership. By January 1977, 48 people had been killed in acts of political terrorism, of whom ten died violently in Madrid in January alone. This prompted Suarez to suspend two constitutional

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.259-260.

guarantees for a month beginning on January 28: the protection against search and seizure, and the right to be charged within 72 hours of arrest.⁶⁹ Although isolated incidents of violence would continue through May of 1977, the decisiveness and courage displayed by Suarez during this period would be rewarded by an enormous increase in respect and prestige from the Spanish masses. The election victory of the UCD, with Suarez as Prime Minister, was not unexpected. The new government was faced with the challenge of restoring the peace following the previous months' social violence, which persisted in the Basque and Catalonia regions. These regions were promised autonomy after the Constitution was ratified, which helped to avert further violence, in the short term, by recognizing their unique political characters; but regional issues would become the government's most chronic domestic issue as more regional demands for autonomy arose. In addition, there was a clear indication that the military was becoming restless with the rampant pluralism that was sweeping the country.⁷⁰ In December 1978, a new Constitution was approved, and, following its signature by the King, new general elections were scheduled for March 1979. The results of those elections were strikingly similar to the 1977 elections, with little ground being gained by the PSOE party.

The re-affirmation of the UCD government brought new rounds of regional violence. This was met with increasingly repressive police measures designed to contain any escalation in the level of violence, but those measures were interpreted by the Spanish

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.263.

⁷⁰ Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, p.58.

public as incompetence in the government. The military had become increasingly frustrated with the government, which had legalized Communism in Spain; and, in 1978, plans for a military coup were uncovered. Realizing that he had lost the confidence of the Spanish people, Adolfo Suarez resigned his position in January 1981. Suarez's appointed replacement was Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, representing the conservative sector of the UCD and an avowed Atlanticist, but before he could be confirmed, a group of Civil Guards marched into the Cortes and held the Cabinet hostage for 24 hours. Decisive action by the King in the face of this attempted coup was paramount to its failure. He quickly demanded that the rebels desist, and enlisted the loyalties of other military officers in defending the Constitution.⁷¹ The following day, Calvo-Sotelo took the oath of office and, in his inaugural speech, announced that he would lead Spain into the Atlantic Alliance. In August 1981, the Council of State was asked to render a decision on the procedures to be followed in voting on NATO membership. The council determined that a simple majority vote of Parliament was all the Constitution required,⁷² and on October 27, 1981, Calvo-Sotelo introduced into parliament the question of NATO membership for formal debate. The UCD government saw this year as critical to formulating Spanish foreign and security policy for the years ahead, as 1981 was also the year for treaty renewal negotiations regarding American military bases.⁷³

⁷¹ Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, p.61.

⁷² Victor Alba, p.110.

⁷³ Emilio A Rodriguez, "Atlanticism and Europeanism", in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, CO., 1988), p.61.

Opposition groups decried the decision of the Council of State as politicized, and adamantly argued that nothing short of a national referendum should decide such an important issue. Public opinion polls in 1981 indicated that 69% of Spaniards approved of a national referendum, and that a full 53% were opposed to NATO membership, with only 18% in favor of continuing the process of seeking NATO membership. The poll figures predicted that if a national vote were taken at that time, that 44% of Spaniards would vote "no" to NATO membership, 18% would vote "yes", and a large portion of the population would abstain from voting.⁷⁴ With the decision to be made by Parliament alone, the UCD government fully expected that NATO membership would be approved.

C. THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT

It was through the 1981 debates on NATO membership that Spanish national objectives and concerns regarding foreign policy and national security were revealed. Pragmatic political leadership would culminate in a stated decision to join NATO, but only within guidelines that would not compromise critical elements of national sovereignty or subject Spain to external manipulation. Foremost of these Spanish objectives was the political need to rejoin the international community. "Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca stressed that 'NATO membership implies breaking away from the tradition of isolation,' and that Spain will be influential in developing the future policies of the entire

⁷⁴ Victor Alba, pp.111-112.

continent...."⁷⁵ An aspiration to begin to dissolve Spain's dependent relationship with the United States, and to continue to promote political interests outside of NATO, particularly in the Arab states and Latin America, was also high on the list of political designs for Spain's future.

Many in Spain thought that NATO membership would provide Spain with greater leverage in efforts to regain sovereignty over Gibraltar, lost to Britain by the Peace of Utrecht which ended the Spanish War of Succession in 1713. Spain expected that only from within the network of NATO could it possibly enlist the sympathies of other Alliance members to exert the pressure needed to compel Britain to release its hold on Gibraltar. NATO membership would also insure Spanish sovereignty over adjacent territorial waters including the Bay of Biscay, the Balearic areas, and the Canary Islands. Economic objectives were centered around the strengthening of the Spanish economy through integration into the EEC. Spain envisioned NATO membership as heralding acceptance in the international marketplace, thus providing for increased foreign capital investment. It was postulated that NATO membership would provide stability for the nascent Spanish democracy, eliminating the threat of internal uprisings such as the coup attempt in 1981.

Calvo-Sotelo proclaimed that "Entry into NATO will kill at birth any attempted

⁷⁵ William L Heiberg, p.31.

coup."⁷⁶ Surprisingly, the enhancement of Spain's defensive posture was the least important of Spanish objectives in deciding to join NATO. Spain's geopolitical position, coupled with a perception that the Warsaw Pact did not pose a significant threat, made Spain's ultimate decision to join the defensive coalition more dependent on economic and political objectives.

Once the debates came to a close, on 29 October 1981, a vote was called for in Parliament to decide the future of Spanish foreign policy. The UCD government prevailed by a clear majority, with 186 "yes" votes, 146 "no" votes, and 14 members absent from the vote. In November 1981, the ratification process began, and in December 1981, Spanish diplomats and NATO staff personnel began preparing the entry documents. The PSOE continued to vehemently oppose the process by which membership had been secured, and promised that if put into power at the next general election, continued Spanish membership in NATO would be put on hold until all of Spain voiced its opinion in a national referendum.

In an ironic development, but certainly not one surprising or uncharacteristic of Spanish politics, it was the very issue of NATO membership which started to cause an internal breakup of the UCD. At the same time the popularity of the PSOE had risen dramatically, playing on the emotional strings of long held anti-Western sentiments, and

⁷⁶ Gregory F. Treverton, p.32. Note - This supposition had proven to be false in other cases; both Greece and Turkey experienced military takeovers of the government while full members of NATO.

instigating an undercurrent of support for the proposed "truly democratic" way to decide the NATO issue. The early months of 1982 demonstrated to the UCD government that significant political change was not far off, and the Socialist Party was gaining larger support as the weeks progressed. The first formal signal that the UCD's hold on the leadership of Spain was waning was the PSOE victory in the Andalusian regional elections of 25 May 1982. This also meant that the Socialists may have acquired enough parliamentary strength to reopen discussion on NATO membership. When word arrived that the Greek government had ratified Spanish membership, Calvo-Sotelo instructed the Spanish ambassador in Washington to immediately deliver the entry documents on Sunday, 30 May 1982, thereby making Spain, officially, the sixteenth member of the Atlantic Alliance. The PSOE would use the unorthodox nature of the "Sunday entry" as a rallying point during campaigns for the upcoming October 1982 general elections.⁷⁷

The October 1982 elections resulted in landslide victories for the Socialist party, whose leader, Felipe Gonzalez, immediately set to dealing with the question of Spain and NATO. The basic goals of the PSOE government were to:

1. negotiate Spanish entry into the European Community (EC),
2. hold the promised national referendum on continued NATO membership,
3. improve relations with France, Great Britain, and Portugal
4. improve relations with the Maghreb to ensure the security of Ceuta and Melilla; and,
5. promote political and economic ties with Latin America.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Emilio A Rodriguez, p.62.

⁷⁸ Emilio A Rodriguez, p.63.

Pragmatism and a strong sense of self-preservation led the PSOE to rethink its hardline position on Spanish membership in the Atlantic Alliance. This turnaround came from the basic acknowledgment that, after more than 150 years of isolation, social strife, and political crisis, NATO membership marked a fundamental advance in recovering Spanish stature in European affairs.⁷⁹ Felipe Gonzalez reasoned that to pull out of NATO now, after Spain had already become a member, might destabilize its bilateral agreements with the United States, and derail potential agreements with other European nations. With public opinion still mounting to pull Spain out of NATO, by a 57% majority, and no date set for the promised referendum, confusion began to set in over the PSOE intentions regarding this issue. Just one year after the PSOE took over the Spanish government, official foreign policy statements were noticeably lacking in any mention of reduced NATO involvement. When the Spanish foreign minister, Fernando Moran, announced that the national referendum would take place before the end of 1986, "when conditions are ripe", he also announced that,

Spain's foreign policy is based on the following principles:

1. an identity with the West;
2. more self-determination in actions;
3. a speed-up of the process of joining the EEC; and,
4. improving relations with neighboring countries as well as Latin American states.

He went on to reiterate that Spain's future is linked to the West, and that "as

⁷⁹ Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain, NATO and Democracy", in Douglas T. Stuart, ed., Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance, (The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1988), p.98.

long as Spain remains in the Atlantic Alliance, it will be a faithful partner and collaborator."⁸⁰ A parliamentary vote on the NATO question was taken in 1985, with an almost unanimous vote to retain Spanish membership (only the Communist Party members cast a "no" vote). The reticence to pursue Spanish withdrawal from NATO was formalized in the 1984 "Decalogue" of Felipe Gonzalez. This statement on conditions for Spain's continued membership in NATO made concessions to nationalistic concerns while linking Spanish participation in the EEC to Spain's continued membership in NATO. The important points of this statement of Spanish national security and defense policy were:

1. Continued Spanish membership in NATO.
2. Remaining outside NATO's integrated military structure.
3. The progressive reduction in the presence of American forces on Spanish soil.
4. The elimination of the U.S. nuclear weapons presence in Spain.
5. The consideration of adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
6. Spanish participation in the Western European Union.
7. The advancement of a definitive solution for the problem of Gibraltar
8. The strengthening of Spain's role in the European Disarmament Committee of the United Nations.
9. Continued development of a network of bilateral agreements for defense cooperation with other Western European nations.
10. Work towards a dialogue between the political forces to elaborate a Joint Strategic Plan.⁸¹

The ambivalence implicit in these points, expressing both a desire for strengthening bilateral agreements while diminishing physical manifestations of those

⁸⁰ The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, (The Xinhua News Agency, October 26, 1983.)

⁸¹ Ibid., p.40.

agreements, is in keeping with a legacy of Spanish non-participation. These terms are also indicative of a deeper cultural mistrust of external, meaning particularly United States, influences on the workings of Spanish politics. The "Decalogue" was a move designed to sway more of the public over to the PSOE leadership's new pro-NATO views. In January 1985, the Spanish defense minister, Narciso Serra, was quoted in "El País" as saying:

Entering the Alliance is not just a military question. The unequivocal decision to be in Europe assumes collaborating in Europe's defense, and it is possible to do so while maintaining the sovereignty to decide our own defense policy... It would be a historic irresponsibility if Spain were to abandon the Atlantic Alliance.⁸²

The level of public devotion to the original PSOE views on NATO was beginning to wane by the end of 1984. With public opinion polls revealing an almost equal division between the "yes's", "no's", and "don't know's", the results of a referendum were impossible to predict. Whether or not the rhetoric linking Spanish membership in NATO to acceptance in the EEC was effective, it was not based in legalities. By March 1985, the obstacles which had kept Spain from realizing its 25-year-old dream of EC membership were finally removed, and the accession paperwork was signed on 12 June 1985. This, however, caused additional pressure to be placed on the holding of the referendum over the NATO question; the Gonzalez government feared that the referendum might go against its wishes, and yet to not hold the referendum, as promised, would irreparably

⁸² Gregory F. Treverton, p.32.

damage PSOE prestige at home and Spanish national prestige among its new allies.⁸³

With pressure from both sides intensifying, the Gonzalez government announced that the referendum would be held on March 12, 1986, and immediately put into action an intense campaign to win votes over to its pro-NATO cause. The government made it clearly known that continued NATO membership was going to be maintained under terms strictly laid out by sovereign Spain. Only the Socialist party was actively promoting a "yes" vote; the centrist and rightist elements were promoting abstention in the referendum, thus drastically skewing poll predictability, and the Communist Party was aggressively pushing for a "no" vote, relying on the tried-and-true tactic of stoking anti-American emotions. Out of nearly 29 million potential voters, 16 million made it to the polls. The Gonzalez government's goal of overturning the negative public attitude towards NATO was successful with 53 percent of voters in favor of continued NATO membership. The referendum of March 12 1986, ended the ten-year-old debate, once and for all, about Spanish membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

The ultimate reason that Spain chose NATO membership was simply that there was no viable alternative. It was part of the process of rejoining the European mainstream. Except for the Communists, all major political groups believed that for Spain to reject NATO or spurn the EEC would be to perpetuate the marginalization and isolation that

⁸³ Angel Vinas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges", in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (Routledge, New York, NY, 1988), pp.167-168.

were integral to the Franco regime, and no responsible politician wanted to see that, or cause that to, happen.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, pp.2-3.

IV. DIMINUTION OF THE MILITARY

A strategic culture defines a set of patterns of and for a nation's behavior on war and peace issues....Strategic culture helps shape behaviour on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations, and strategic doctrine.⁸⁵

It would be erroneous to imagine the Spanish Army as a huge military machine powerfully organized to obtain the highest possible fighting efficiency....The Army is a bureaucratic machine which spends most of the money paid to it in salaries for generals and officers, a less amount in war material, and a still lesser sum in preparing for war. The Army, in fact, is more important as an instrument of home politics than as a weapon of war.⁸⁶

At the time of Franco's death in 1975, the Spanish military more closely resembled a Latin American force than a NATO army. The Spanish army had 565 generals, averaging 73 years of age, and approximately sixty-two percent of the military budget was spent on personnel (compared to 43 percent in West Germany and 40 percent in Great Britain).⁸⁷ The military had remained the primary means of keeping the Franco regime in power right up to day Franco died. After 1945, the role of the military was oriented much more towards internal security than external defense, taking on more direct antisubversive and counterinsurgency functions.

⁸⁵ Ken Booth, p.121.

⁸⁶ Hungarian journalist Arthur Koestler, 1931, cited in Michael Peck, "Spain: Cautious and Complex", Defense and Foreign Affairs, July, 1988, p.26.

⁸⁷ Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, The New Spain - From Isolation to Influence (Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, N.Y., 1994), p.30.

Military influence in civilian matters was evident in that active duty officers participated, and held offices, in all major government organizations. The three military branches (Army, Navy, and Air Force), together with the Vice-Presidency for Defense, debated and voted on government policy through membership in the Council of Ministers; the Cortes; the Council of the Realm; the National Council of the Movement; the National Defense Board; Security Agencies; and local governments. The military had an autonomous judicial system for military affairs with expanded jurisdiction in civilian matters.⁸⁸

Military judicial personnel staffed a special Tribunal to prosecute political dissidents, and it ordered widely publicized, and globally denounced, executions, the last taking place in 1974. The Armed Police and Civil Guard, although administratively placed under the Office of the Ministry of the Interior, were governed by military regulations and procedures, and, up until 1976, were under the command of active duty army generals. Both of these civil units were fully militarized.⁸⁹ The transformation of the Spanish civilian population by the urbanization and industrialization that had taken place between the 1950's and 1970's was not experienced by the garrisoned members of the military. The military had much less contact with the newly developing social structures, and became

⁸⁸ Felipe Aguero, The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts: Spain in Comparative Perspective (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University 1991), p.69. Now published as Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD., 1995)

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.72.

alienated from the attitudes and values of an increasingly cosmopolitan populace.⁹⁰

Sidelined in the transition immediately following Franco's death, the military leadership, composed primarily of diehard Franco supporters, began to feel that democratization was leading Spain in a direction from which an eventual return to the policies and practices of the old regime would no longer be possible. Internal rumblings among a small group of military leaders, not unlike the "pronunciamientos" of old, began to stir anew following a series of unrelated events that were an affront to traditional military sensibilities.

First came the electoral reform of 1976, in which the Communist party, as well as many other formerly prohibited political groups, was given Constitutional legalization. Military leaders claimed that then Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez had promised that this was something he would never allow to occur. Soon after, the Royal Decree Law 10-1977 regulated the exercise of union and political activity by members of the Armed Forces. The decree-law established that there could be no public expression for any political organization, no outward expression of political views, nor any attendance at public meetings of a political nature, by members of the armed forces. The appointment of any person in the military to a civilian public office required that the individual be retired from

⁹⁰ Stanley G. Payne, "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Spanish Transition", in Robert P. Clark and Michael H. Haltzel, eds., Spain in the 1980's - The Democratic Transition and a New International Role (Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA., 1987), p.84.

military service. As a result, many officers had to resign from their political appointments and quit associations with political organizations.⁹¹

General Gutierrez Mellado, appointed to the newly created post of Minister of Defense, set about a program of both modernizing and downsizing the armed forces. The army was subject to the most extensive changes proposed for the military, and several thousand senior commanders found themselves suddenly "retired" from military service. The full scope of Mellado's proposed reform for the military was not realized due to budgetary and political constraints. The disdain that the military felt for democratization in Spain was sharpened when Basque nationalist and Marxist terrorist groups increased their campaigns of targeting military officers as a means of publicizing, and recruiting support for, their causes. The first officer was killed in 1977, and the first general was killed in 1978. Army officers who felt compelled to speak out against the current political trends were quickly relieved of duty by the government, often with punitive measures taken against them. They were replaced by appointing moderates, or moderate liberals, to their command posts in order to discreetly change the political balance in the military hierarchy.⁹²

Overt expression of the traditional military sentiment took form in an attempted coup on February 23, 1981. As the members of the Spanish Parliament debated the

⁹¹ Felipe Aguero, p.76.

⁹² Stanley G. Payne, pp.87-89.

confirmation of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as Prime Minister, Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, along with a small group of military and civilian followers, stormed the Cortes and held the members of parliament hostage. The standoff that followed was punctuated by the inability of the military coup-makers to gather additional support from among the remaining members of the military, most of whom expressed loyalty to the King and the new democratic government. A televised declaration by King Juan Carlos, bedecked in full military dress, that he would not abdicate to the conspirators, consolidated the resolve of the remaining military officers, who complied with the 1978 Royal Ordinance which stipulated that "no soldier is compelled to obey orders which imply acts contrary to the law or which constitute crimes, in particular against the Constitution".⁹³ Within hours Tejero surrendered, and the attempted coup ended peacefully.⁹⁴ The king's actions in averting the attempted coup constituted a display of unambiguous assertion for support of the democratic constitution of 1978 and increased substantially the people's respect for him as their monarch.

With the most important hard-line military leaders now facing trial and prison sentences for their participation in the abortive coup, there was a slow but steady realization that democracy in Spain was here to stay. The Calvo-Sotelo government was the first since 1939 which did not include a single military officer in the cabinet. Civilians were appointed to high positions in the newly formed Ministry of Defense. The authority

⁹³ Felipe Aguero, p.77.

⁹⁴ Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, p.17.

of these civilians came under fire from those officers now subordinate to the Ministry, and the working relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the military itself was a combative one.

The civilianization of high cabinet positions did not eliminate the undercurrent of military displeasure with the new government, and a final coup attempt was planned for the eve of the National Elections set for 28 October 1982. This coup attempt was never carried out, because the plans of the rebels were discovered a few days prior to the takeover date. Those officers were later tried and found guilty of rebellion, and sentenced to up to twelve years in prison.⁹⁵ Military reforms, quickly undertaken by the victorious Socialist Party after the 28 October 1982 elections, would ensure that an attempted military takeover of the Spanish government would no longer be a possibility.

The strategy employed by the Socialist government was to quietly bring the military under civilian control. To effect the changes, the Organic Law of 1984 laid the groundwork for the institutional restructuring of the armed forces. The 1984 Law assigned to the Prime Minister the responsibility for defining strategic and military policy, and authorized him to order, coordinate, and direct the implementation of military policy by the armed forces. The position of Chief of the Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa - JEMADD) was created as the highest position within the armed forces, and would be held, on a rotating basis, by a senior military officer of each of the three services.

⁹⁵ Felipe Aguero, p.299.

The JEMADD would have command responsibility of the three armed services, and would act as commander in chief during wartime. The JEMADD reported directly to the Minister of Defense, a position now completely in civilian control.⁹⁶

Rather than appointing a member of Parliament who was knowledgeable about the military, and who knew about security and defense issues, Prime Minister Gonzalez selected Narcís Serra i Serra as the Minister of Defense. Serra had no military experience and knew very little about the military, but he was both discreet and effective in carrying out his assigned tasks. Serra went about implementing the government's plan to place the military under civilian rule, and, to legitimate and cover the plan, officially described it as a modernization plan.⁹⁷ Wholesale removal of top military leaders was carried out by Serra, partly in reaction to their opposition to several government reform measures, including the reduction of the length of conscription from 18 to 12 months, and recent changes in the military judicial system which enlarged the individual rights of soldiers.⁹⁸

In July 1984, Vice Admiral Salvador Moreno de Alborán was ordered removed from his position as the director of the naval war school for circulating a memo in which he implied that his promotion would be held up because of governmental policies. In

⁹⁶ Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, pp.295-296.

⁹⁷ From interview notes between Prof. Thomas C. Bruneau of the Naval Postgraduate School and Fernando Rodrigo, 15 February 1993, conducted at CERI. Used with the permission of the interviewer.

⁹⁸ Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, p.296.

October 1984, Lieutenant General Manuel Alvarez Zalba was removed from command of the 5th Military region for criticizing United States policy in the Mediterranean. General David Fernandez Teijeiro, in January 1985, was removed from the military governorship in León following a speech in which he praised former dictator Francisco Franco. In February 1986, General Abel Barahona was removed from his post for allowing an official military publication to include an article which praised the 1981 coup attempt. In October 1986, General Andrés Cassinello was removed from the Civil Guard general staff for authoring a newspaper article which was critical of politicians, judges, and journalists. The military governor of Guipúzcoa, General Angel Díaz Losada, was removed in June 1987 for making controversial statements on regional independence and federalism. In October 1987, the military governor of Zaragoza was removed for criticizing a ministerial appointment to the 4th Military region. The extent and rapidity of the Defense Minister's actions in punishing high ranking military leaders who expressed displeasure with the ongoing reforms prompted one major assigned to the ministry to comment, "in the military we are more fearful of talking than of AIDS".⁹⁹

By 1987, no military officers participated in decision making bodies concerned with societal issues. Institutions such as the Council of the Realm and the National Council of the Movement had been dissolved as a result of democratic reform. Military personnel no longer were involved in the Cortes, which now consisted of representational deputies from electoral districts, or in the Council of Ministers, where the individual service

⁹⁹ Felipe Aguero, p.352.

representatives, as well as the Vice-President for Defense, had been replaced by the civilian Minister of Defense. The armed forces were also deprived of any direct involvement in the area of domestic security. The forces now charged with "protecting the free exercise of rights and liberties and to guarantee citizens' security" were all led by civilians.¹⁰⁰ The Supreme Council of Military Justice was eliminated and replaced with a special unit within the Supreme Court to deal with military affairs. In October 1986, a civilian was appointed to the position of General of the Civil Guard for the first time since its inception in 1844. Additionally, any member of the armed forces who held a commission in the National Police Corps had to either return to his service branch, or retire.¹⁰¹

With the army no longer involved in domestic or political matters, and, more importantly, no longer posing the potential for a military takeover of democratic Spain, the Gonzalez government was able to safely direct its attention to defining Spain's relationship with both the United States and NATO. Felipe Gonzalez's position on continued NATO membership for Spain had dramatically shifted since 1982. He reasoned that NATO membership would be an important bargaining chip in negotiating Spain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC), which Spain saw as necessary to regaining stature in the international community. Public opinion in Spain was still strongly anti-American and anti-NATO, and Gonzalez had to contend with the challenge of

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp.76-78.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.77, note #29.

recommending continued NATO membership in a way that did not make it appear that he was subjugating Spanish sovereignty or betraying the platform which put the Socialists into power. Gonzalez had made it clear that his government would not join NATO unless EEC membership was assured. Following the EEC summit in Dublin in December 1984, however, Spain was told that before it would be accepted into the Common Market, it would have to clarify its future role in NATO. Having promised the Spanish people that a national referendum would decide the NATO issue, Gonzalez undertook a campaign to delay the vote until public opinion could be swayed in NATO's favor. With Gonzalez's position on NATO membership revealed, Spain was approved for admission to the EEC on 12 June 1985.¹⁰² Three weeks later, Gonzalez reshuffled his cabinet, replacing outspoken NATO opponents with people who favored NATO. The Gonzalez government played up the admission to the EEC as a political coup to make continued NATO membership more palatable, and presented NATO as a European institution, minimizing the pre-eminent position of the United States.¹⁰³

With a military coup no longer a foreseeable risk, and membership in the EEC secured, Prime Minister Gonzalez was able to direct his attention to the political issues which faced the recently democratized nation. There were widespread fears that membership in the Atlantic Alliance would serve the interests of the United States more

¹⁰² Admission date was 1 January 1986.

¹⁰³ Adrian Shubert, "The Socialists and NATO: Bringing Spain Back Into Europe," The Nation, Volume 241, December 21, 1985, pp.672-673.

than those of Spain. The upcoming renewal of the U.S. basing agreements, scheduled for 1987, was raised as an issue of reclaiming Spanish sovereignty that had been forfeited by Franco in the original 1953 defense agreement.¹⁰⁴

In keeping with the demands set forth in his 1984 "Decalogue", Gonzalez demanded the removal of the 72 F-16 fighter aircraft of the U.S. Air Force's 401st Tactical Combat Wing from the Torrejon air base, located just outside the Spanish capital of Madrid. This demand confounded both U.S. and NATO observers, who found it difficult to reconcile Spain's actions with Spain's recently acquired defensive commitments. Spain wanted the removal of forces assigned to assure Spain's defense.¹⁰⁵ The Socialist government reasoned that it did not intend to join the integrated military structure because, as a rearguard nation, it would undertake no missions that would require the participation of national forces under a non-national command. Spain further reasoned that the F-16's of the 401st Tactical Combat Wing, assigned to SACEUR, should be removed precisely because Spain was not a member of the integrated military structure, and it was important that no NATO forces be permanently stationed on Spanish soil.¹⁰⁶ The Gonzalez government refused to hold any further discussion regarding Spain's formal defense responsibilities within NATO until the Torrejon issue was resolved. A final

¹⁰⁴Vicente Blay Biosca and Rene Luria, "Spain's Contribution to the NATO Alliance", International Defense Review, Vol.21, No.7, July 1, 1988, p.777.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.776.

¹⁰⁶ Antonio Maquina, in Kenneth Maxwell ed., p.52.

agreement was signed on January 15, 1988, with the United States agreeing to remove the 401st Tactical Combat Wing from Torrejon to a base to be built, with NATO funding, in Italy.

Spain's desire to emphasize its resurgence in the international community, and to exercise sovereignty over its land and air-spaces, was displayed in April 1986 when Spain, like France, denied permission for overflight by F-111 fighter-bomber aircraft participating in the U.S. raid on Libya. The use of Spanish bases by U.S. forces was elevated to issue status when one of the aircraft declared an in-flight emergency and landed at the naval base in Rota.¹⁰⁷

In the context of operations outside the NATO area, Spain continues to act as it did in the past. Despite the 1953 agreements and U.S. financial assistance, Francoist Spain refused to support the 1973 U.S. airlift of supplies to Israel. In 1979, the Suarez government delayed granting permission for F-15 aircraft participating in the Iranian crisis to be refueled at Spanish airbases. Spain also openly defied NATO consensus and supported Argentina during the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict.¹⁰⁸

The official military coordination proposal between Spain and NATO, approved by

¹⁰⁷ Michael Peck, "Spain: Cautious and Complex", Defense and Foreign Affairs Magazine, July 1988, p.32.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

the Defense Planning Committee as well as NATO's Atlantic Council, mentions six defensive missions for Spain:

1. Responsibility for naval and airborne operations in the eastern Atlantic,
2. Defense and control of Spanish airspace,
3. Naval and airborne operations in the western Mediterranean,
4. Defense of Spanish territory,
5. Use of Spain as a logistics rear area, and
6. Control of the Straits of Gibraltar and its approaches.¹⁰⁹

As a full member of NATO, the six Spanish missions for the defense of the Alliance are essentially the same as those Spain had when it was outside the alliance. In 1956, when Spain was rejected as a possible NATO ally, the General Staff's of Spain, Portugal, and the United States met to discuss the missions available for western defense. These missions amounted to nothing more than the territorial defense of the Iberian peninsula, and its surrounding waters and airspace.¹¹⁰ This suited the Gonzalez plan of using NATO membership to gain access to the EEC, without becoming too closely involved with, or incorporated into, NATO institutions. The political issues that concerned Spain the most were also issues that NATO could not be relied upon to assist Spain in addressing.

Spain has, for example, long denied Moroccan claims to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, historic Spanish possessions on the North African coast; but Spain cannot rely on

¹⁰⁹ "Growing Into A New Role," Jane's Defense Weekly, Vol.14, No.22, December 1, 1990, p.1089.

¹¹⁰ Antonio Marquina, p.49.

NATO assistance should those Moroccan claims be militarily expressed. There is also a long-standing dispute between Spain and Britain regarding the territorial possession of Gibraltar. Spain had reasoned that Spanish membership in the Alliance could help to enlist more support for Spain in this hotly contested area. Spanish feelings in support of regaining possession of Gibraltar run so high that Spain has refused to recognize NATO's Gibraltar Mediterranean Area (GIBMED) command, or to participate in any NATO exercises that are coordinated through GIBMED. Any joint arrangements with NATO for the defense of the Straits of Gibraltar are made by a circuitous route through the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) or the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Here there is a clear disparity between Spanish military interests and Spain's declared intentions to participate in defending the interests of NATO.¹¹¹

The missions that Spain outlined for itself were primarily naval and air force missions; consequently, military budgets were re-allocated, favoring those services over the Army. As Army budgets were cut, so too were end strength requirements in both personnel and active army units. In addition, for those army personnel who were left, there was no clear mission for them to prepare for. Between 1985 and 1995, conscription was progressively reduced from eighteen to twelve to nine months of obligatory service. The percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that went to the military was incrementally reduced from 2.1% in 1985, to 1.57% in 1991, to 1.32% in 1992, to 1.27% in 1993. This figure increased to 1.67% in 1995, but is still short of the 2.0% of GDP which has been

¹¹¹ Vicente Blay Biosca and Rene Luria, p.776.

recognized as "the minimum necessary to bring the Spanish Armed Forces onto a par with [those of its] European allies."¹¹² Funds that were to be used for modernizing Spanish forces went instead to providing generous retirement packages to displaced officers. These officers, in many cases, would continue to receive 80% or more of their salaries until they reached age 65. Then they would be eligible to receive compensation from the regular civil service pension scheme. The feeling was that these officers were being "bought off" to keep them from interfering with the government goals of progressively weakening the military and subjugating it to civilian authority. This was causing morale problems among the lower ranks who felt that their superiors were not fighting for them sufficiently.¹¹³

Personnel end strength in 1980 was around 300,000. Today it is closer to 175,000, with 70% of that number comprised of conscripts. The Army went from 22 brigades to 15, yet is manning only half of those; the rest were administratively maintained in order to retain a full complement of officers. Colonel Robert Pool of the Defense Plans Division, U.S. Mission to NATO, noted in a 23 March 1993 interview that NATO member nations include reserve units "to be recalled to attain wartime authorized strength" when reporting personnel end strengths. Reserve forces represent some 50% of all NATO forces, and this

¹¹² Statement of the Minister of Defense in a report to Parliament on 19 May 1992.

¹¹³ From an interview conducted by Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., with D. Antonio Marquina at the Facultad de Ciencias Politicas, Campus Sonrosagrias in Madrid on 4 March 1993. Dr. Bruneau noted that Marquina stressed how the higher ranks had been bought off, domesticated, and pacified. The government does not focus on the problems of the armed forces or on security policy, and decisions are made at the level of the Ministry of Defense or higher. Used with permission of the interviewer.

figure is even higher for the armies. However, there is a large disparity in the training that is conducted within each country's reserve forces, and this disparity could lead to problems in mobilization. Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain conduct no training at all for reserve forces, and annual reserve mobilization exercises consist of little more than a telephone call.¹¹⁴ In 1989, Spanish Colonel Amadeo Martinez Ingles was imprisoned, by direct order of the Defense Minister, for decrying the wholesale reduction of military capability by the Gonzalez government. He strongly advocated an end to conscription, saying that the Spanish Army needed to be professionalized, and suggested that "the army was so poorly trained that it could hardly be considered operational."¹¹⁵

The effect that a lack of training can have on operations is exemplified by the experience of Italy's airborne contribution in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. On their first combat mission in the Persian Gulf, all but one of the ten Italian Tornado aircraft, the full Italian contribution to the coalition forces, could not participate because bad weather hampered the Italian pilots' ability to conduct aerial refueling. The lone aircraft that did embark on its mission never returned, and the pilot later turned up on Iraqi television as a prisoner of war. A retired Italian general blamed successive governments for sapping the military's strength, saying: "You cannot improvise military capability when the time

¹¹⁴ Interview conducted by Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Used with permission of the interviewer.

¹¹⁵ Patrick Blum, "Spain 5: Focus on the Past - The Military", The Financial Times, 19 February, 1990, p.v.

comes."¹¹⁶ The lack of actual military capability of the Spanish armed forces, along with a professed constitutional inability to commit national forces outside the immediate NATO area, resulted in the reluctant participation of Spain in NATO-approved operations in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia.

The support offered by Spain in the Persian Gulf War was due, primarily, to a desire to improve Spanish-U.S. relations, which had been weakened during the basing agreements negotiations. The token naval contribution was more a political move, to give the impression that Spain was a willing and able participant, than an actual military move to bolster coalition effectiveness or capabilities. The one frigate deployed never ventured closer to Persian Gulf waters than the approaches to the Straits of Hormuz, conducting Maritime Interdiction Forces (MIF) boardings, and the two corvettes only got as far as the Red Sea. In a turnaround from a historical position of not allowing the United States use of Spanish bases for out-of-area operations, Spain did allow the operation of, and provided fuel for, U.S. B-52 bombers from its Morón air station, and offered Spanish F-15 fighters to escort the B-52s for at least a portion of their routes.¹¹⁷ Germany, like Spain, cited constitutional limits to deploying forces out-of-area, but did send ships to the Mediterranean to relieve U.S. warships on patrol. Germany also committed \$6.6 billion to the U.S. war effort, and provided extensive logistics support to the coalition. Both the

¹¹⁶ James Walsh, "A War Machine That Works - So Far", TIME Magazine, 4 February 1991, p.36.

¹¹⁷ Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence, (Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, N.Y., 1994), p.54.

German and Spanish excuses for not placing military personnel in harm's way in the Gulf region have come under fire as issues of national policy and not constitutional mandate.¹¹⁸

Several NATO nations made important contributions in the Gulf War. Britain and France both placed their ground troops in Saudi Arabia under U.S. command. For France this was particularly remarkable, as the French had withdrawn from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 following a dispute centered around what the French called U.S. domination. Britain provided 36 Tornado fighter-bombers along with its entire 1st Armored Division. French pilots, in Jaguar fighter-bombers, conducted low-level sorties over a three day period against the Iraqi Republican Guard troops. France also had 10,000 ground troops, including many Foreign Legion veterans familiar with desert terrain and the "Arab mind", providing invaluable augmentation of U.S. forces. Saudi Arabia provided 32,000 troops, and petitioned to provide the first units to cross over into Kuwait should an invasion be required. Egypt and Syria provided 36,000 and 19,000 troops respectively, and even Honduras was able to muster 150 troops for in-country service. The Japanese government, desiring to ensure it had contributed its fair share to the Gulf War effort, increased its monetary contribution to \$9 billion, and sent military aircraft to the region to help rescue Gulf evacuees. This brought protests within the Japanese parliament that such action violated Japan's constitution.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ David C. Morrison, "Beyond NATO", The National Journal, Vol.23, No.8, 23 February 1991, p.452.

¹¹⁹ James Walsh, p.36.

The limited Spanish participation in the Gulf War has been echoed by Spain's contribution to the current NATO missions in the former Yugoslavia. The United States has committed about 20,000 troops to keeping the peace in the war-torn region; the British, about 13,000; and the French, approximately 9,500. The number of Spanish troops in the region is 1,200. Spain, even counting a small naval presence and logistics support teams, can claim no more than 2,400 total military personnel committed to the NATO mission in Bosnia.¹²⁰

Demonstrating a continuing reluctance to become involved in activities outside of direct national concerns, Spain continues to deserve the reputation it earned during the Franco years as essentially a non-participant in the international arena. The still-prevailing undercurrent of anti-Americanism was fostered during the Spanish-American War, and bolstered by Spain's exclusion from the benefits of the Marshall Plan and the delay of the end of Franco's regime by U.S. financial intervention. Spain still struggles with a reputation as an unreliable partner within NATO, and this reputation is exacerbated by a feeling, particularly among U.S. observers, that Spain interprets the process of European integration in anti-American terms.¹²¹ Recognizing that the U.S. military presence in

¹²⁰ "The President's News Conference with European Union Leaders in Madrid", Public Papers of the Presidents, Document 2118, 3 December 1995. Note - Spain has had a peacekeeping presence in Bosnia, comprised of 780 volunteers, beginning in October 1992. The proposal of sending this landing force was met with opposition from within the Army, and there are claims that it has been severely micro-managed by the office of the Ministry of Defense.

¹²¹ Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, p.15.

Europe, through NATO, is the only credible assurance of near term European political stability, Spain takes the most minimal actions it sees as necessary to be perceived as a dependable ally. It has also been using its position within NATO as a lever to force more attention to be paid to Mediterranean issues, and has become increasingly friendly with France, which shares similar security concerns as a southern flank nation.

Long protected from any perception of a credible Soviet threat by distance and the physical barrier of the Pyrenees, Spain's primary goals have been accession to the EC, regaining importance in European affairs, and insulating Spain from a possible North African threat to its Maghreb possessions. The use of NATO membership as a doorway to the EC was successfully accomplished in 1985, and there are indications that Spain has also been increasingly successful in drawing NATO's attention to its southern concerns. Evidence of this includes:

1. The New Strategic Concept #12, agreed to in November 1991, which specifically mentions the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East regions.
2. The standing up of NATO's Standing Naval Forces, Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) in mid-1992.
3. The success of the Iberian Atlantic (IBERLANT) Command's coordinated exercise, "Linked Seas", which included scenarios of regional contingencies in North Africa. Spain had originally refused to participate in this exercise because Britain would be using Gibraltar, but decided that it was so important that Spain would participate.
4. Internal discussions in NATO on the likely use of NATO Rapid Reaction Forces in the region, and the increasingly accepted stance that out-of-area operations, when conducted with the agreement of NATO member nations, do not constitute a violation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

With the possibility that an internal military takeover might catalyze a shift in strategic culture no longer a foreseeable reality, and with no readily identifiable external threat on the horizon, the question becomes, is there any challenge which Spain is currently facing that cataclysmically threatens the survival of sovereign Spain, and might bring about a significant cultural shift? The answer may lie in the current state of the Spanish economy.

V. IMPENDING CATAclysm?

The dominant social structures of a group of people might lead to characteristic strengths and vulnerabilities of each society when making money or making war.¹²²

The actions Spain takes in addressing its current economic problems will help to determine whether Spain can shrug off the legacy of isolationism and assume a new strategic stance, or whether it will succumb to the values and beliefs which keep Spain on the economic periphery of Europe. Achieving economic stability, by way of social and political budgetary reform, is the best means to address the security issues facing Spain's newest government. Fiscal burdens rooted in the Franco legacy of isolationism fostered a welfare system now threatening to bankrupt the nation, and ultimately led to the demise of a Socialist government unable to correct its budget deficits. A review of Spanish economic conditions is necessary to appreciate the severity and magnitude of Spain's current predicament.

A. ECONOMIC ISOLATION

The advancements achieved throughout most of Western Europe, Britain, and the United States, particularly after World War II, were unavailable to Spain because it was not a signatory to the Marshall Plan. Self-imposed isolationism under Franco, who sought

¹²² Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters", in International Security, vol. 19 (Spring 1995), p.24.

to keep both capitalism and communism from ruining "eternal" Spain, directly impaired the possibility of a parallel Spanish industrial development. Spain was one of the most backward of the Western-oriented nations, falling into near Third World status while situated on the borders of a thriving European Community.

Spain's initial move out of backwardness came with the opening of the Spanish economy to foreign markets. "As the 1940's drew to a close, agricultural imbalance, labor unrest, and a growing pressure for industrial development forced the Franco regime to begin to modify its autarchic policies. Spain's need for food, raw materials, energy, and credit made it necessary for the country to establish some link to the international economy."¹²³ This goal was achieved when, in 1950, Spain struck a deal with the United States to allow military bases on Spanish soil in exchange for \$62.5 million. With the influx of external capital, economic and domestic living conditions began to improve and, following the Stabilization Plan of 1959, improvements accelerated dramatically as Spanish industrial production boomed into the next decade. But the industrial revolution in Spain was artificially supported by a traditional policy of high tariffs, protectionism, and a striving for self-sufficiency; these practices ultimately resulted in a fiscally backward Spanish economy in the 1960's.¹²⁴

The commercial opening of 1959 produced a deficit in the balance of trade due to

¹²³ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz., p.46.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.xxvii.

the low competitiveness of Spanish products and the great need for imported capital goods and raw materials. This deficit was primarily financed by: a flow of capital into Spain through the tourist boom of the 1960's; remittances sent home by Spanish workers who had emigrated to seek employment in the more developed European countries; and foreign investment.¹²⁵ This influx of capital produced high growth in both production and national income, yet it was a period of very unstable growth that was rapidly followed by periods of recession. When production increased quickly, it generated a deficit in the balance of payments that, given the regime's policy of maintaining fixed interest rates, produced a progressive loss of capital reserves, thereby necessitating the adoption of restrictive, and theoretically corrective, economic measures. The consequent recession reestablished a trade balance and these economic strictures were removed; the cycle began all over again.¹²⁶

The opening of the Spanish market in 1959 was by no means a complete opening. The economy was not actually designed to be dependent on market forces for the use and distribution of resources, and the State still maintained policies of subsidizing national industry along with quantitative restrictions on imports. National industry took the form of steel and shipbuilding, as well as textiles and footwear. These essentially "standard" entry vehicles into modernity were lucrative in that they required no special technology or

¹²⁵ Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, p.143.

¹²⁶ Carlos Alonso Zaldivar and Manuel Castells, "Spain Beyond Myths", (Alianza Editorial, S.A., Madrid, 1992.)

production costs, and could exploit a cheap and abundant labor force, which continued to grow as workers moved from agriculture to industry, and as an increasing number of women entered the workforce. In spite of the strengthening economy, full employment could not be achieved, resulting in emigration during this period.¹²⁷

In 1973, the oil embargo, and resultant rise in prices of imported raw materials, caught Spain unprepared to adapt to changing market pressures. The rise in oil prices was not matched by an increase in the price of oil products. State subsidies continued to artificially protect the domestic economy and national industry. Spain suffered from losses in its external markets as the increase in worldwide oil prices was met by a decrease in world-market demands for steel and shipbuilding. The textiles and footwear industries were also hit hard by more competitive production in both South America and the newly industrializing countries (NIC's) of East Asia. The end result was an increase in the public deficit, and a drop in commercial surpluses. As the deficit was not being addressed by natural reactions in market forces, but rather through the State-owned Banco de España, there was an ever-rising rate of inflation. External trade imbalances widened as imports greatly exceeded exports, and they could not be corrected even by the devaluation of the peseta in 1976. This inability to control the balances of trade accounts manifested itself in a reduction of foreign investment, and the deficit ultimately had to be financed by tapping into currency reserves.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

The Moncloa Pacts of 1977 included a further devaluation of the peseta along with other measures to initiate economic reform; however, industry still failed to adequately adapt to the economic rules of supply and demand, and the problem remained even after the second oil crisis of 1979. During the period from 1975 to 1982, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an average rate of only 1.5% annually in real terms and the gross formation of capital decreased by an average rate of 2.5% in real terms.¹²⁸

During the 1980's, the authorities endeavored to establish the basis for sustained growth and to prepare the Spanish economy for future entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1982, Spain was still faced with low growth rates, high inflation, a high and growing unemployment rate, and a \$4 billion deficit in the balance of payments. A gradual adjustment policy was implemented in order to minimize adverse social costs. Objectives were to reduce basic inflation, foreign and public debt, and unemployment. It would be three years before the economy entered a phase of expansion, and Spain would be accepted into the EEC. The eventual fall in the price of oil during this period aided to increase the Spanish national income; and a concurrent drop in the interest rates promoted increased investment. With industry making the transition to market conditions, a period of growth ensued which was fueled primarily through increases in investment; and it came about at a time when accession into the EEC would force the Spanish economy to deal with open foreign competition. Spain realized an increase in real production of about 20% from 1986 to 1988. Increases in production were rewarded with increases in employment,

¹²⁸ Ibid.

reducing unemployment figures by 4.2%, with the actual unemployment figure stabilizing at 17% of the work force. This marked Spain's, and Europe's, most rapid period of economic growth; public deficits decreased along with a lowering of the inflation rate.

By mid-1988, the opening of the economy to foreign competition began to have a negative effect. Although production was still growing, domestic demand for foreign goods increased to an annual rate nearly three points above domestic production; this caused a rise in domestic prices and resulted in a trade imbalance. After 1989, the Government implemented restrictive supply and demand measures in order to correct the imbalance.

The 1991 Budget emphasized the sharp growth of transfer funds which corresponded to the increase of spending by the Instituto Nacional del Empleo (National Employment Institute), a result of the rise in unemployment benefits, the increase in unemployment rotation and the existence of certain deficiencies in the management and control of its spending. The remarkably rapid growth recorded in this spending, and the deficit being generated by the unemployment insurance system compelled the Government to ratify a Decree to correct this trend that threatened to bankrupt the system and hence its very survival.¹²⁹

Certain revenue expenditures were undertaken, including the elimination of the wage review clause based on inflation for public sector employees, and the freezing of public employment in 1992 and 1993. Real GDP barely grew in 1992 (see Table 1) and declined by approximately 1% in 1993. The main source of inflationary pressure is the

¹²⁹ Dr. José Luis Pardos and Ricardo Mor, "End of Economic Expansion", Sí Spain via the internet, 1992.

fiscal deficit.¹³⁰

Table 1. Economic Indicators -- 1968-1992¹³¹

INDICATOR	1968 - 1973	1974 - 1979	1980 - 1985	1986 - 1990	1991	1992
GDP - % change	6.7	2.2	1.4	4.5	2.4	1.2
Unemployment - %	2.7	5.3	16.4	18.6	16.3	18.2
Inflation - %	6.7	18.3	12.8	6.5	5.9	5.4

Despite an enviable rate of growth in the industrial sector, Spain continues to be beset with an excessive rate of inflation, an unprecedented unemployment rate, and only marginal real growth in GDP. Industrial growth, increased foreign investments, and the steady rises in GDP (4.8 percent per year between 1986 and 1991) that Spain enjoyed following EU partnership in 1986 were short-lived. In 1992, following the Olympics in Barcelona and the Seville Expo, Spain began a plunge into recession. The peseta would be devalued three times in 1992 and 1993 in order to remain competitive in its export markets, and by 1995, a total of five devaluations had taken place since the Socialists took power. In 1993, GDP dropped by 1.1 percent, amounting to revenue losses of \$8.9 billion, and, concurrently, unemployment numbers rose dramatically - by 600,000 in 1993 alone - to a total of approximately 3.68 million unemployed by year's end in 1994

¹³⁰ The World Factbook, (Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., 1994), p.368.

¹³¹ Loukas Tsoukalis, The New European Economy, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993), pp.24-27; and Survey on Spain, Financial Times, April 2, 1993.

(see Table 2).¹³²

Table 2. Comparison of Key Economic Indicators of Selected NATO Nations

	Spain	France	Germany	U.K.
National Product - GDP	\$515.8 Billion	\$1.08 Trillion	\$1.35 Trillion	\$1.05 Trillion
GDP Real Growth Rate	1.8%	2.4%	2.9%	4.2%
Industrial Growth Rate	4.0%	2.6%	2.8%	5.6%
Inflation Rate	4.9%	1.6%	3.0%	2.4%
Unemployment Rate	24.5%	12.6%	8.2W/13.5E	9.3%
Import / Export	\$93 / \$73 B	\$238 / \$249 B	\$362 / \$437 B	\$215 / \$200 B
Budget Revenue/Expend.	\$98 / \$128 B	\$220 / \$249 B	\$690 / \$780 B	\$325 / \$400 B
External Debt	\$90 Billion	\$300 Billion	NA	\$16.2 Billion

Source: 1995 CIA World Factbook

Adding to the basic problems Spain has had in adapting to a free-market economy, and possibly Spain's most serious obstacle to overcoming its economic deficit, is the wide array of social benefits that can also be linked to the Franco regime. During Franco's rule, workers were at the mercy of the state. There was no right to strike or of free collective bargaining, but Spaniards became accustomed to the security of having permanent employment contracts. For those Spanish workers who did have jobs, it was virtually impossible to be laid-off or fired, even for the substandard work of those who were unqualified for their positions. The jobs-for-life mentality became deeply ingrained in

¹³² David White, "Survey of Spain-Recovery Seems Likely", *The Financial Times*, 11 May 1994, p.38.

Spain.¹³³

Social programs instituted in 1982 by the Gonzalez government, designed as restitution for the hardships suffered under Franco, have since ballooned into a true "cradle-to-grave" welfare system. A recent raising of the school leaving age to 16 from 14, when coupled to the 85 percent of education costs being paid by taxpayers, has resulted in a doubling of the university population and has necessitated additional monetary outlays for education buildings and teacher training. Free health services and pension rights have been extended to the entire population - regardless of whether individuals have paid into the social security system. The nationwide unemployment benefits program has been stretched to the limits as unemployment rates in 1995 passed 24 percent, the highest among OECD countries. It is estimated that, in over 1 million households in Spain, nobody has a job. Despite a tripling of Spain's economy in the past thirty years, and a rise in population by 25 percent, there were no more jobs in 1994 than there were in 1964.¹³⁴ Current spending on unemployment benefits is approximately 4 percent of GDP, one of the highest ratios in all of Europe. Additionally, the practice of providing free pharmaceutical products puts another fiscal burden on an already overstretched national budget.

¹³³ David White, "Jobs No Longer For Life," The Financial Times, 11 May 1994, p.40.

¹³⁴ David White, "The Periphery is Just Too Far Out," The Financial Times, 11 May 1994, p.37.

The Spanish pension system for retirements is currently based on the averaging of 100 percent of earnings over an eight year period prior to retirement, much more generous than the systems in even richer EU countries, where lifetime earnings are averaged. Pension spending in 1982 was approximately 11.4 billion dollars. By 1992 that figure had quadrupled. In 1992, there were 2.9 million Spaniards over the age of 65 receiving pension benefits; that number had increased in 1994 to more than 5.3 million. If drastic reforms are not implemented soon, Spain will not be able to pay pensions, possibly as early as 2015. This problem has been compounded by a drop in the fertility rate from an average of 2.6 children per woman of childbearing age in 1977 to the current rate of 1.2.¹³⁵

Besides straight retirement pensions, Spain offers a variety of financial stipends that, when taken altogether, means that almost 10 million of approximately 40 million Spaniards are currently on some form of government assistance. This assistance comes in the form of:

1. retirement pensions as previously described;
2. death allowances - paid to those who covered the costs of the burial of the deceased, presumably the family, and to continue for 5 years from the date of death;
3. widow's pension - provided to the spouse of the deceased (in 1992, there were over 1.6 million widows and widowers receiving this pension, equivalent to \$371 U.S. monthly);
4. orphan's pension - in case both parents die, children under 18 years of age receive a monthly payment equivalent to approximately \$300 U.S. per month in 1992 dollars;
5. family benefits - paid to relatives of the deceased if they could show they

¹³⁵ Tom Burns, "Hard Choices on Welfare", The Financial Times, May 11, 1994, p.39.

- were financially dependent and in need due to the death (27,455 families received the equivalent of \$350 U.S. per month in 1992); and
6. disability benefits - with pensions paid on a scale depending on the severity and permanence of the disability.

Severance pays for discharged workers are also a huge drain on the Spanish economy, with the Spanish average duration of payments being 45 weeks, more than twice the average for other EU countries.¹³⁶ In 1992, there were almost 6.5 million people receiving pensions, of some sort, from the Spanish social security system. This number has steadily increased since then.

In January 1996, a special commission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended a series of drastic measures intended to reduce the public deficit. The report demanded cuts in social benefits, specifically in retirement pensions and unemployment benefits. The report, while recognizing recent improvements in Spain's economic performance, warned that the next two years will be critical if Spain is to meet the objectives of convergence in order to form a part of the European Monetary Union.¹³⁷ The Gonzalez government had taken this report, along with recommendations of its own financial planners, quite seriously and had already formulated plans that promised a gradual reduction in the deficit from 7.3 percent of GDP in 1993 to the required 3.0 percent by 1997. In April of 1994, the Gonzalez government unleashed an advertising campaign designed to persuade Spaniards to become more public-spirited and to pay their

¹³⁶ David White, "Jobs No Longer For Life", p.40.

¹³⁷ La Vanguardia de Barcelona, 12 February 1996, p.43, via the internet.

income taxes. This campaign backfired because at the same time the news agencies reported that the former governor of the Bank of Spain had avoided paying taxes on profits from investments made while in office.¹³⁸

Along with the problems of excessive spending in its social programs, Spain has also been plagued with political scandals that eroded the credibility, and eventually the viability, of the Gonzalez government. Mr. Mariano Rubio, while governor of the Bank of Spain, is alleged to have embezzled stock investment gains into a secret personal account; and Luis Roldan, another Socialist appointee, reportedly managed to amass a real estate fortune while heading the Guardia Civil. These incidents provoked two ministerial resignations and two departures from the Parliament of Felipe Gonzalez's former cabinet colleagues.¹³⁹ More recently the Spanish Minister of the Interior was charged with organizing and funding "death-squads" aimed against supporters of the Basque separatist movement beginning as far back as 1982. The reputation of the Socialist government had been "gravely damaged" by these affairs, and more damage may arise as a result of a Parliamentary commission established to investigate party financing.¹⁴⁰

The March 1995 consumer price index in Spain reported continued disappointment

¹³⁸ David White, "Survey of Spain - Recovery Seems Likely", The Financial Times, 11 May 1994.

¹³⁹ David White, "The Periphery is Just Too Far Out," p.37.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

in Spain's ability to resolve its economic situation: the "highest inflation and unemployment rates among the central EU countries make clear the lonely position of the Spanish economy on the continent."¹⁴¹ Then-current predictions were that the short term would see little improvement; a cure would result in a rise in interest rates, and in the collapse of the money markets and of the international price of the Spanish currency.¹⁴² A recovery, which had been expected due to predictions of a good tourist season, had been cut short by the adoption of a value added tax, a devaluation of the peseta, an increase in fuel prices, a rise in the price of services, and a natural drought, which combined put the yearly inflation rate at 5.1 percent, more than twice that of the core EU states.

Also in March 1995, the Ministry of the Economy expressed concern that measures to reduce the budget deficit to 3 percent of GDP had been postponed until 1999. The worry was that this would send a message "that there is a laxness in the effort to reduce the deficit that the financial markets might translate into a rise in the interest rates."¹⁴³ The reduction to a budget deficit of 3 percent is one of the five strict Maastricht prerequisites for passage to the third stage of the Monetary Union and the adoption of a single currency.¹⁴⁴ The other Maastricht requirements are:

¹⁴¹ "Inflation Seen as Threat to Convergence Criteria", Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (FBIS-WEU-95-072), 14 April 1995, p.34.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ "PP Economic Plan To Raise Interest Rates", FBIS Daily Report, 29 March 1995, p.17.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

1. inflation over a twelve month period must not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points the average rate among the three EC countries with the lowest inflation;
2. long-term interest rates over twelve months must not exceed by more than two percentage points the average for the same three countries;
3. the national currency must remain in the narrow band of the exchange rate mechanism for at least two years without a devaluation; and
4. the total public debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP.¹⁴⁵

Mr. Pedro Solbes, economic and financial minister since 1993, started working on Spain's 1996 budget in January 1995, a full 5 months ahead of the normal time-table for budget preparations. By May 1995, he was prepared to present the most restrictive budget ever to a Spanish government, calling for severe austerity measures in order to be able to meet the convergence plan to economic and monetary union.¹⁴⁶ He considers adoption of his plan critical to sending the signal that Spain is sincerely determined to put its fiscal house in order. Mr. Solbes acknowledged that his plan is sure to come up against opposition from his political colleagues, primarily "from the public works ministry, which has considerable spending earmarked for infrastructure projects, and from the employment and social security ministries, which are wary of any spending cuts."¹⁴⁷ Mr. Solbe's budget proposal for 1995 had come under criticism as not being tough enough, thus requiring more drastic measures in both 1996 and 1997 to meet monetary goals. But even the 1995 budget did not contain the deficit, as planned, when it ran into a government decision to

¹⁴⁵ Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, The New Spain, From Isolation to Influence, (Council On Foreign Relations Press, New York, N.Y., 1994), pp.50-51.

¹⁴⁶ Tom Burns, "Austerity Seen As Cure for the Deficit", The Financial Times, 23 May 1995, p.2.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

raise public employee salaries and increase pension benefits to keep pace with inflation. The increased cost of debt servicing created by higher interest rates caused projected spending of 550 million pesetas to be set aside, and resulted in a March 1995 devaluation of the peseta by 7 percent. Mr. Juan Jose Ruiz, chief economist at the Argentinia banking corporation, said these additional burdens had a "devastating" effect on hopes of controlling expenditures.¹⁴⁸

In June 1995, the EU Ministers agreed to postpone applying the criteria for acceptance into the monetary union until 1999. By that time it was apparent that Spain had little chance of meeting a 1997 deadline.¹⁴⁹ Pedro Solbes vehemently argued that Spain must still move toward a goal of reducing the current budget deficit from 5% to 3% of GDP, and that his proposed austerity budget must be enacted. Jordi Pujol, Minister of the Catalan region, called the drastic nature of Solbe's budget "socially unacceptable," and added that, since there will certainly not be a single currency until 1999, that "it would be naive to try to be the first in this regard." Solbe countered by declaring that it is imperative to be able to show a 3 percent budget deficit as soon as possible because "sooner or later the deficit will have to be increased," and that a proper interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty demands that "decisions on who will meet the conditions by 1999

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ This decision was made not only in response to Spain's situation, but because it is apparent that a number of countries will not be able to meet the Maastricht requirements by 1997.

will [still] be made at the end of 1997."¹⁵⁰

Meeting the monetary union requirements by 1997 is critical to Spain's desires of reaching a level of modernity on parity with the rest of Europe. Economic solvency can only be achieved by shrugging off the established patterns of lifelong subsidies, seen as entitlements, by the Spanish public. The new Aznar government may recognize that undertaking drastic proposals to stabilize Spain's economy is fraught with political consequences; it implies that future Spanish well-being may be sought at the cost of alienating a public still beholden to an isolationist past. The internal disputes centered on the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements may gain momentum if the Socialists lose considerable representation in Parliament and the government enacts stringent budgetary policies. These proposals may involve making students responsible for full tuition costs; raising the retirement age from 65 to 70; eliminating labor laws which require pay equity even among trainee employees (in fact, the introduction of low-wage apprenticeship contracts has already been undertaken as a means of stimulating employment); and severely reducing the leverage the labor unions have had over wage controls and employer hiring practices. Spain is attempting to break the stranglehold that strong unionized labor has had over hiring and firing practices. Apprenticeship programs for people between the ages of 16 and 25 will allow wages at 70 percent of the statutory minimum for a period

¹⁵⁰ Francisco de Andres, "EU Ministers Agree to Postpone Monetary Union to 1999," FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-95-120, 20 June 1995, p.46.

lasting between six months and three years.¹⁵¹

As a security issue, resolving Spain's economic problems will have wide-spread effects, but two things must occur before Spain's finances can pull themselves out of even deeper problems. The economy must recover and meet the deadlines set by the Maastricht Treaty for inclusion in the monetary union; and the limitations of the welfare system, and its effects on the Spanish economy, must be properly understood by the politicians and properly explained to the people.¹⁵² If the State can make progress in reducing internal public spending, Spain may reach the level of economic security and prosperity enjoyed by many of its EU partners. Despite record unemployment numbers, production output in Spain is still growing; and Spain currently enjoys the largest tourist market in the world, with total tourist numbers in 1994 exceeding the total resident population. Financial predictions in 1994 were that Spain may, for the first time, be able to wipe out the traditional deficit in its balance of payments. Analysts then believed that the figure could move into surplus for the first time since 1986, the year of Spanish accession into the EU.¹⁵³ While most private forecasts were less optimistic, the consensus was that Spain had begun to make real changes in public spending, and that the future economic stability of the State was finally assured.

¹⁵¹ David White, "Jobs No Longer For Life," p.40.

¹⁵² Tom Burns, "Hard Choices on Welfare", p.39.

¹⁵³ David White, "Survey of Spain-Recovery Seems Likely," p.38.

But in 1995, few of the predictions were realized, and, on March 3, 1996, the thirteen-year period of Socialist rule in Spain ended. The election of a more conservative head of government, in the form of Jose Maria Aznar, is testimony to the dissatisfaction the Spanish public has had with the poor fiscal-housekeeping of the previous administration, as well as being a denunciation of the drastic nature of the budget reform package put together by Pedro Solbes. In effect, the public has rejected the rational policies, recognized as such by the political elites, necessary to effect a profound, albeit harsh, change in the Spanish political and strategic culture. Still, in order to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty by 1999, the new Prime Minister will have to: halve the budget deficit from its current 5.9% over the next three years; bring down inflation; privatize more of Spain's state-owned, and unprofitable, industries; and reform the country's labor laws. Aznar claims that he can do this by making government more efficient, while at the same time promising tax cuts and reducing unemployment. Contemporary political analysts expect that Aznar will declare that the economic situation is worse than he had realized before the election, and that sacrifices will need to be made in order to keep Spain financially solvent.¹⁵⁴

The People's Party is regarded as a Francoist party with expectations of preserving in Spain the culturally instilled isolationism that the PSOE had, in the previous thirteen years of governmental rule, been unsuccessfully attempting to eradicate. Entry into NATO, the EU, and the WEU, despite the initial PSOE resistance, were, at least,

¹⁵⁴ "Change in Spain?", The Economist, February 24, 1996, p.52.

examples of positive steps Spain had taken in order to achieve its desire to belong to, and have political importance in, a more open and integrated Europe.

The People's Party (PP) candidate, and new Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar, has openly countered the fears that a PP government would return to the ways of Franco. His campaign has been centered on fixing the domestic economy. While recognizing that cuts will need to be made in many areas of social spending, he has promised that he will not institute a wholesale reform of the welfare system as was recently attempted in France. He has said that pensions, as well as an array of other benefits, will not be touched.¹⁵⁵

As the last of the major Western nations to industrialize, Spain has witnessed more economic failures than successes. The dependency of the people upon governmental stipends and subsidies is a result of the overbearing structure of the Franco regime. In an attempt to compensate for years of hardship, the socialist government had instituted generous welfare programs, and put itself into an ever-deepening fiscal morass. Turnarounds at this point will be difficult and painful for both the economy and the people, but analysts concur that drastic measures are still necessary. The political motivations of the Gonzalez government resulted in the postponement of those necessary measures, and the Aznar government is facing the realization that "inflation in Spain has a structural and permanent nature," and that "the reforms necessary to put prices at

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

acceptable levels, beginning with strong budgetary discipline, have not been tackled yet," a fact which continues to make Spain "the last car in the European Union train."¹⁵⁶ That the Spanish public has voluntarily rejected making the sacrifices that are necessary to see a turnaround in their national economy, preferring to maintain the programs initiated during the isolationist past, is indicative of the legacy of isolationism in their strategic culture that continues to assert itself as an enduring, and thus far permanent, part of the character of Spanish society.

¹⁵⁶ "Inflation Seen as Threat to Convergence Criteria", FBIS Daily Report, 14 April 1995, p.34.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Although Felipe Gonzalez's Spain has struggled mightily to enter the European arena as a full partner in every sense, Spanish voters are still haunted by the Civil War and Franco legacies which imposed the habit of national isolation and the rule of power over law.¹⁵⁷

Spain appears stalemated in its efforts to shrug off the legacy of isolationism still characteristic of Spanish strategic culture since the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. That legacy has been instrumental in giving rise to the social and political problems threatening to keep Spain near the bottom of political and economic importance in Europe. To finally rid Spain of that legacy, and to raise Spain's stature as a valued member of NATO and the European Union (EU), would require a fundamental shift in the Spanish strategic outlook. Such a shift thus far has been both fiscally unattainable and socially unacceptable. While real changes have been made in the way Spain conducts its foreign relations, the fundamental cultural shift in strategic outlook requisite to providing semi-permanence in a move away from isolationism has not taken place. In this respect, Spain has made little progress towards realizing its desire to achieve parity, on almost all levels, with the leading powers of Europe.

The relationship that has developed between NATO and Spain, since Spanish accession to NATO in 1982, has been a one-sided affair. Spain continues to reap the

¹⁵⁷ Michael Peck, p.26.

security and political benefits of NATO membership while fulfilling, in only the most minimal sense, the obligations and responsibilities of that membership. This less than optimal situation for NATO has raised serious concerns regarding the intentions of those states currently expressing a desire to be included in an enlarged NATO. As the prospect for NATO enlargement has increased, so has NATO's resolution to require more explicit and demonstrable conformity to NATO principles by those states wishing to follow in Spain's footsteps. Rejecting the claims of Spanish observers that, "far from being an exception, not integrating into the allied command structure will be the normal mode of membership in the near future",¹⁵⁸ much of the recent literature on NATO enlargement recommends that NATO define specific criteria for membership. The consensus in this literature is an implicit statement that NATO desires "no new Spains."

Gebhart von Moltke, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, wrote in the January 1996 issue of NATO Review:

New members will not only enjoy all the rights of membership under the Washington Treaty, but will have to assume all obligations as well. They will need to accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time they join. The willingness and ability to meet such commitments, not only on paper but in practice, will be a critical factor in any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance. The resolution of ethnic or external territorial disputes, by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles, will be, for example, a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join. The

¹⁵⁸ Fernando Rodrigo, "The end of the Reluctant Partner: Spain and Western Security in the 1990s," in Roberto Aliboni, ed., Southern European Security in the 1990s, (St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y., 1992), p.105.

very prospect of potential membership already provides countries with a strong incentive to strengthen their democratic institutions, ensure civilian control over their armed forces, and settle disputes and establish good relations with their neighbours.¹⁵⁹

He also stressed that "new members must accept all the obligations set out in the Washington Treaty", and that membership will require matching contributions to Alliance security and stability, not merely the consumption of security. Von Moltke also stated that,

Partnership for Peace will help to prepare possible new members both politically and militarily, familiarize them with Alliance structures and procedures, and deepen their understanding of the obligations and rights that membership will entail. Clearly, however, Partnership for Peace is neither a substitute for membership, nor a guaranteed path to membership.

In this context Partnership for Peace might be used as a mechanism through which observable changes in a state's strategic culture, in keeping with Alliance missions, may be assessed. In several cases, such changes will be necessary before NATO determines whether a state will receive an invitation for full Alliance membership. This is a legitimate approach because NATO will lose much of its leverage for influencing domestic reform once a nation is admitted to the Alliance.

The September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" addresses many of the criteria that NATO will expect potential members to conform to before an invitation to join the Alliance is offered. It also stresses that adherence to the particulars of the

¹⁵⁹ Gebhart von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement", in NATO Review, No.1, January 1996, Vol.44, pp.3-6.

Washington Treaty is expected. This implies that no longer will states be allowed to join under the type of concessions made to Spain. States will accept all of NATO's requirements, or be denied membership.¹⁶⁰

In a March 1996 report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and House National Security Committee, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, W. Bruce Weinrod, suggested that it is likely that NATO will apply political and economic membership standards for new members. These standards fall into three main groups: domestic criteria; international criteria; and military criteria, and are in keeping with the recommendations laid out in the Alliance's official study on NATO enlargement. The standards outlined in each of these groups are designed to ensure that the nation's fidelity to, and participation in, NATO missions will not evaporate once membership has been secured. The standards will require that states attain a strategic outlook in accordance with the standards, and expectations, of the current core NATO nations. Shifts in the earmarked states' strategic cultures will need to be transparent and substantially complete, because NATO has little desire to replicate its Spanish experience. Specifically, this report outlines the following criteria:

Domestic criteria:

1. Democratic institutions and practices,
2. A market economy,
3. The rule of law, including protection for minority rights, and
4. Civilian control of the military, intelligence agencies, police, and internal security forces;

¹⁶⁰ "Study On NATO Enlargement," Chapter 1, via the internet.

International criteria:

1. Renounce all territorial claims on other nations,
2. Submit disputes with other nations to arbitration, and
3. Reshape national militaries for defensive missions only;

Military criteria:

1. Contribute to Alliance capabilities, without undermining their effectiveness,
2. Agree to join the integrated military structure,
3. Strengthen [military capabilities] quickly in line with NATO standards,
4. Work towards operational compatibility with NATO forces,
5. Make territories and facilities available for NATO use,
6. Predetermine exactly how national forces will be structured and deployed in peacetime, and wartime, to fulfill NATO security commitments to new members.¹⁶¹

Real change has occurred, albeit in an evolutionary, almost glacial, sense in Spain.

Forward-thinking members of the new political elite have discussed and proposed measures to bring Spain out of its isolationist past. The available literature dissecting Spain's current problems is filled with recommendations for the direction policymakers in Spain need to move in order to achieve the desired shift away from isolationism. The paradox is, then, why have those recommendations not been successfully implemented? The answer may lay in the peaceful transition of Spain's political structure, and the lack of any "cataclysmic" event to cause a fundamental shift in Spain's strategic outlook. Ultimate political authority in a democracy lies in the will of the voting public. Unless an alteration in the basic values and belief systems of this group takes place, real change in the strategic outlook of the nation will be postponed. Owing to these larger factors, membership in

¹⁶¹ Bruce Weinrod, "NATO Expansion: Myths and Realities; A Special Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House National Security Committee," The Heritage Foundation Reports, 1 March 1996, via the Internet.

NATO has had little impact on Spain's strategic culture.

The tremendous political influence wielded by the public is reinforced by culturally ingrained values that cannot be overridden through introspection alone. Unable to recognize the impediments to progress implicit in traditional Spanish isolationism, the public tends instead to blame the problems of the state on the perceived ineffectiveness of democracy itself. Recently, Europe has witnessed a shift in the political attitudes of some of the newly formed democracies. Poland elected a former Communist as President in 1995, having become frustrated with the inability of the then-current administration to ratify a constitution after five years of democratic rule. Spain likewise recently elected a former Francoist as Prime Minister rather than submit to the harsh economic policies proposed by the Socialists, even though those policies are internationally recognized as being necessary to effecting a turnaround of the failing Spanish economic system. There are widespread fears that the upcoming elections in Russia will see the return of a Communist hard-liner to power.

All three of these states have undergone democratic transitions by relatively peaceful means. Without a singular "cataclysmic" event to initiate a radical transformation in national strategic culture, these states continue to display the values and beliefs which had been ingrained during their experiences under the former regime. The mass publics appear to have become nostalgic in their desires for a political system in which those traditional beliefs and values were more fully satisfied.

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